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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to demonstrate the tension between human security’s core 
categories of freedom from fear and freedom from want.  The two core categories 
of human security are often held to be complementary to each other.  However, by 
applying a human security analysis to the War on Drugs in Bolivia, particularly 
with reference to the ideas of freedom from fear and freedom from want, it can be 
seen that the War on Drugs in Bolivia typifies a freedom from fear approach.  
This is illustrated through the War on Drugs focus on protecting individuals from 
physical violence and human rights abuses relating to situations of conflict, as 
well as its use of coercion strategies, such as sanctions or non-unilateral force; all 
of these of which are usual to a freedom from fear approach. 
 
An examination of how the War on Drugs has impacted upon the individuals of 
Bolivia reveals that despite the desired outcome of protecting individual safety 
and well-being, the War on Drugs has actually compromised the safety and well-
being of Bolivians.  In addition, in typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs 
in Bolivia has also challenged freedom from want by marginalising or threatening 
economic, community, food and health security, and thus defying claims that 
freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary.  
 
This thesis concludes that by pursuing political and personal security, freedom 
from fear marginalises and even contests food, health, environmental and most 
especially economic and community security – the focal points of freedom from 
want.  Security policies adopted to address transnational threats in developing 
countries must ensure that they not only account for the freedom from fear and 
freedom from want components of human security, but that they also account for, 
and manage, the potential for freedom from fear to undermine the wider goals of 
freedom from want. 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Thanks to Dr. Robbie Shilliam for his patience, guidance, and encouragement, but 
most of all, for helping me to ‘see’ on this journey. 
 
My deepest appreciation goes to Finn, for his never-ending motivation, 
reassurance, and peer-reviews.  Thank you for always being by my side even 
when I got stressed and grumpy. 
 
Thanks to Lauren, mi querida amiga, for the use of her translation skills, and 
Cameron for his research advice. 
 
Also, thanks to Pippo, Jo Jo, and Sam for being my team of readers and for 
providing a quick turn-around even though you had your own busy schedules. 
 
Thanks to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/NZAID for supporting my 
studies and to the Victoria University of Wellington Faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences for my research grant. 
 
Special thanks to all my family and friends for their endless support despite my 
limited availability over these past two years – I have missed you. 
 
Most especially, thanks to my Dad, Sidney, for never losing faith in me. 
iii 
ACRONYMS 
 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
DEA  Drug Enforcement Agency 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FELCN Fuerza Especial de Cucha Contra el Narcotráfico/Special Force for 
Fighting Drug Trafficking  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GNP Gross National Product 
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
UMOPAR Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural/Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Bolivia 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
US United States  
USD United States Dollars 
 
 
iv 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
Abstract............................................................................................................. ii 
Chapter 1: Introduction..................................................................................... 6 
Chapter 2: The Human Security Concept......................................................... 10 
2.1 From Classical Security to Human Security the UNDP Way.............. 11 
2.2 The Canadian and Norwegian Approaches to Human Security 
(Freedom from Fear)............................................................................. 
 
15 
2.3 UNDP’s Human Development Paradigm and the Japanese Approach 
(Freedom from Want)........................................................................... 
 
18 
2.4 Freedom from Fear versus Freedom from Want.................................. 21 
2.5 Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want in the Context of the 
War on Drugs in Bolivia....................................................................... 
 
26 
Chapter 3: The War on Drugs in Bolivia through the Lens of Human 
Security............................................................................................................. 
 
28 
3.1 The War on Drugs: security for whom, and for what values?.............. 28 
3.2 The War on Drugs: security from what threats?................................... 29 
3.3 The War on Drugs: security by what means?....................................... 33 
Chapter 4: The War on Drugs in Bolivia and the Tension Between Freedom 
from Fear and Freedom from Want.................................................................. 
 
43 
4.1 The Means Used to Fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia Threatens its 
Own Goals of Personal, Political, and Environmental Security........... 
 
44 
4.2 The War on Drugs in Bolivia Marginalises Economic, Community, 
Food and Health Security..................................................................... 
 
57 
4.3 How the War on Drugs in Bolivia Impacts Upon Food and Health 
Security................................................................................................. 
 
70 
Chapter 5: Conclusion...................................................................................... 72 
Bibliography..................................................................................................... 74 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Table 1:  summary of differences between classical security and human 
security.............................................................................................................. 
 
14 
Table 2:  classification of issues identified by the Canadian & Norwegian 
approaches to human security........................................................................... 
 
17 
Table 3:  cumulative definition of freedom from want..................................... 21 
Table 4:  summary of differences between freedom from fear and freedom 
from want.......................................................................................................... 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coca, Bolivia, and the War on Drugs: the tension between 
freedom from fear and freedom from want 
What does a human security framework of analysis of the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia reveal about the concept of human security, particularly with regard to 
the conceptual reconciliation of freedom from fear and freedom from want? 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Are freedom from fear and freedom from want complementary to each other, or 
can they exist to the detriment of the other, or to human security overall?  A 
human security analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia demonstrates the tensions 
between human security’s core categories of freedom from fear and freedom from 
want.  The case study in this thesis illustrates that by pursuing political and 
personal security, freedom from fear marginalises food, health, environmental and 
most especially economic and community security – the focal points of freedom 
from want. 
 
Human security has emerged since the early 1990s to provide a framework for 
understanding and responding to a variety of transnational threats that fall outside 
the scope of classical security.  Since its emergence, human security has become 
known as encompassing two primary approaches: freedom from fear and freedom 
from want.  Freedom from fear approaches to human security focus on direct 
threats to individuals and communities, such as physical violence and human 
rights abuses.  In contrast, freedom from want focuses on less direct, often more 
structural threats, such as economic livelihoods, cultural dignity, environmental 
threats, food security, and access to health care.  
 
The War on Drugs is a useful case study for examining the tension between 
freedom from fear and freedom from want because it seeks to address a wide 
range of security threats using measures derived primarily from a freedom from 
fear approach.  The War on Drugs embodies a supply-side response to the drug 
problems and security threats created by the transnational illicit drug trade.  Under 
the label of the War on Drugs, the United States (the US) and the United Nations 
6 
 
 
(the UN) have applied economic, political, legal and military pressure on the 
drug-producing states of South America, including Bolivia, in an effort the stop 
the flow of narcotics into the US and around the world.  As part of the War on 
Drugs, the US has sponsored large-scale efforts to reduce coca cultivation in 
Bolivia, often with the direct assistance of US law enforcement agents, 
contractors, and even military personnel.  The relative success of the War on 
Drugs has been the topic of extensive debate and is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  Instead, this thesis uses the War on Drugs in Bolivia as a case study to 
better understand human security.  
 
The War on Drugs in Bolivia is a prime candidate for a case study in human 
security because of its position as a major cultivator of coca.  Bolivia also has a 
large portion of its population involved in some form of the coca or cocaine trade, 
as well as a long history of indigenous use of coca.  Significantly, the use of 
Bolivia as a case study facilitates this thesis’ examination of the tensions within 
approaches to human security as Bolivia lacks the direct ‘classical’ security 
threats, such as armed insurrection or invasion, that plague other coca growing 
countries.  The lack of major classical security threats in Bolivia allows for a 
clearer examination of human security threats, and the responses that they 
provoke.    
 
In his article, A Human Security Approach to US Illegal Drugs Policy, Simon 
Wells discusses the War on Drugs through the lens of human security.  Wells 
argues that human security is especially useful as an analytical framework because 
the War on Drugs raises a number of aspects that human security is concerned 
with.  These are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
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Human security considers a wide range of interconnected security threats that can 
exacerbate each other.  Wells uses the following example to illustrate how threats 
related to the War on Drugs aggravate new threats:  
the pollution (environmental security) caused by crop spraying leads to 
respiratory diseases (health security) and also reduces the ability of farmers to 
produce food from the land (food security).  These impacts in turn affect the 
ability of local people to support themselves financially (economic security) 
and may force them to abandon their homes (community security).1 
 
Human security stresses the need for cooperation between states when dealing 
with transnational issues, which is especially important to a global concern such 
as the international illicit drug trade.  Therefore, a human security framework can 
offer valuable insight into alternative strategies for the War on Drugs.  It is argued 
that by pursuing state interests, the War on Drugs not only threatens the security 
of individuals in producer-countries, but it also fails to provide security to those 
whom it was devised to protect.   
 
This thesis will extend the last point by arguing that a human security analysis of 
the War on Drugs in Bolivia, with particular reference to the ideas of freedom 
from fear and freedom from want, reveals that the justifications and strategies for 
the War on Drugs correspond with freedom from fear.  Furthermore, this thesis 
will argue that the War on Drugs in Bolivia demonstrates the difficulty in 
reconciling freedom from fear and freedom from want – for one person, coca can 
mean survival and cultural dignity, whereas for another, coca can mean living in 
fear of crime or denial of a fair trial.  This thesis suggests that by looking at how 
the strategies adopted to pursue freedom from fear have impacted on the lives of 
Bolivians, it can be seen that the War on Drugs in Bolivia is at the cost of freedom 
from want, thereby demonstrating the mutual exclusivity of the two core 
categories of the human security approach. 
 
                                                          
1 Simon Wells, “A Human Security Approach to US Illegal Drugs Policy,” Revue de Sécurité 
Humaine / Human Security Journal, no. 1 (April 2006): 56. 
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This thesis proceeds by determining the meaning of human security by firstly 
looking at its emergence from classical security, which is thought of as 
inadequate, to explain the complex threats of today’s interdependent world before 
turning to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) concept of 
human security.  After considering UNDP’s concept of human security, I will 
discuss the freedom from fear and freedom from want components that represent 
alternative (although often thought to be reconcilable) approaches to achieving 
human security.  The third chapter of this thesis will then explore the strategies 
adopted for the War on Drugs in Bolivia and in doing so will show how the War 
on Drugs’ focus on the protection of individuals from physical violence and 
human rights abuses, as well as its use of coercion through sanctions and force, 
typify a freedom from fear approach.  Finally, I will explore how the War on 
Drugs impacts the lives of Bolivians.  By doing so, I will show how the War on 
Drugs in Bolivia (as a freedom from fear approach) is in contention with freedom 
from want and thereby suggesting that the US’ involvement in the War on Drugs 
is driven by reasons other than the physical safety of Bolivians.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT 
What is human security?  Most impressions of human security link it to UNDP’s 
1994 Human Development Report, however human security has its ancestry in 
security debates that predate this report.  Most importantly to this thesis are the 
freedom from fear and freedom from want components of human security, which 
have their roots in US President Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ State of the Union 
speech on 6 January 1941.  As asserted by Kevin Boyle and Sigmund Simonsen, 
“Roosevelt’s vision of ‘a world founded upon four essential freedoms’ – freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear – was 
to become one of the cornerstones of the new United Nations.”2 
 
Roosevelt’s four freedoms have become enshrined into the UN’s perceptions of 
human security and humanity through the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights3 and the UN Charter.4 When UNDP produced its 1994 Human 
Development Report, the concept of human security that was presented reflected 
aspects of Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ speech, as well as referencing debates 
around the limitations of classical security models and the rise of globalisation.  
Human security has also been adopted by countries that have incorporated the 
concept into their foreign policies in a manner that not only reveals their 
perceptions of the international community, but that further defines the 
components of freedom from fear and freedom from want. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I will discuss human security in a general 
sense by looking at how the concept developed from critiques of classical security 
to the popularised explanation set out by UNDP.  Second, I will define freedom 
from fear by discussing the Canadian and Norwegian governments’ approach to 
human security.  Third, I will define freedom from want by looking at the UNDP 
                                                          
2 Kevin Boyle and Sigmund Simonsen, “Human Security, Human Rights and Disarmament,” 
Disarmament Forum 3 (2004): 6. 
3 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, preamble, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
4 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations 1945, preamble, http://www.un.org. 
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human development paradigm and the Japanese government’s approach to human 
security.  Fourth, I will consider the differences between freedom from fear and 
freedom from want in order to establish the analytical framework for this thesis, 
which will be used to show that freedom from fear and freedom from want can be 
at odds with one another.   
  
To understand human security, and to clarify the distinction between it and 
classical security, as well as the difference between freedom from want and 
freedom from fear, we need to draw upon four questions that are central to any 
security debate.  Kanti Bajpai in Human Security: concept and measurement sets 
out four questions, which were developed from David A. Baldwin’s The Concept 
of Security, to help his readers comprehend the elements of security theory, and 
these questions are: security for whom, security for what values, security from 
what threats, and security by what means?5  It is through considering these 
questions that the key debates, critiques and challenges, as well as the analytical 
framework that are central to this thesis, will develop. 
  
2.1 From Classical Security to Human Security the UNDP Way 
There is no doubt that UNDP has championed the popularisation of the human 
security concept.6  UNDP perceives the human security concept as an alternative 
to classical security,7 whose limitations began to be realised after the Cold War.  
Until then, the realist or ‘classical’ concept of security dominated security debates 
and focused them on the integrity of the state and its territory.  In terms of 
Bajpai’s four questions, classical security can be characterised as security for the 
state, to protect values such as state sovereignty and national security, which are 
                                                          
5 Kanti Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement” (Kroc Institute, August 2000), 9. 
6 Alexandra Amouyel, “What is Human Security?,” Revue de Sécurité Humaine / Human Security 
Journal, no. 1 (April 2006): 10; Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, “Rethinking Human 
Security,” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 4 (2002 Winter 2001): 585; Amitav Acharya, 
“Human Security: East versus West,” International Journal 56, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 444; Roland 
Paris, “Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?,” International Security 26, no. 2 (Autumn 
2001): 89-90; Sabina Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2)” 
(Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, 2003), 13. 
7 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 12-13. 
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threatened by other states.  The means by which the state and its values are 
protected is through force, and generally of the unilateral kind. 
 
Globalisation presented new challenges for the international community by 
introducing new threats of a transnational nature.  For example, the illicit drug 
trade, people trafficking, terrorism, disease, environmental degradation, and the 
decline of state control over their territory.  Threats also take the form of state 
actors, non-state actors and natural catastrophes; all of which are invisible in the 
classical security model.8  As noted by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS): 
The traditional, narrow perception of security leaves out the most 
elementary and legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding security in 
their daily lives.  It also diverts enormous amounts of national wealth and 
human resources into armaments and armed forces, while countries fail to 
protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, 
inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental 
hazard.9 
 
Through globalisation, the world has become more interdependent than ever and 
thereby, the number of indirect threats (and their associated impacts) have not 
only increased, but are also more real.  This is explained by Bajpai as follows, 
“[our] fates have become intertwined with those people who, in another era, 
would have remained isolated from us.”10 As classical security is virtually only 
concerned with unilateral force, it fails to take into account the interdependent 
nature of the global community. This narrow focus renders classical security 
insufficient to describe the multifaceted and interconnected nature of threats such 
as the illicit drug trade.  Such threats have necessitated the development of a 
wider concept of security, in the form of the human security paradigm, as is 
demonstrated by the wide spectrum of security responses adopted to fight the War 
on Drugs.  
 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, December 2001, 2.23, http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp. 
10 Paul Heinbecker, “Human Security,” Behind the Headlines 56, no. 2 (1999): 4. 
12 
This is not to say that human security replaces the security of the state, but rather 
that “the concept of human security should be seen as an extension of this older 
tradition and in the context of a broader security discourse.”11  State security is 
still important because it can be a means to individual security, but it is not more 
important than individual security.  This is because there are threats to individual 
security that go beyond the state’s ability to manage.  For example, threats can 
come from both military and non-military sources,12 and they sometimes even 
come from the state itself.   
 
It was in 1994, in the UNDP Human Development Report that human security 
first gained widespread exposure.  On top of seeking to shift the security referent 
from states to individuals, this report set out seven dimensions or threats to human 
security: economic security (assured basic income and freedom from poverty); 
food security (access to food); health security (access to health care and freedom 
from disease); environmental security (freedom from environmental degradation); 
personal security (freedom from physical harm); community security (cultural 
dignity and physical safety of cultural and ethnic groups); and political security 
(freedom from political oppression).13  The wide range of these dimensions 
reflects the idea that UNDP seeks to re-establish the equal weighting of freedom 
from fear and freedom from want at a global level.14 
 
To achieve this, UNDP seeks a change in focus of domestic and international 
policies so that they incorporate basic needs and human rights, as well as 
productive and remunerative employment.  Therefore, UNDP advocates for the 
restructuring of the international community through the reform of international 
institutions and changes to national and international policies.15  However, any 
                                                          
11 Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies Perspectives 2 
(2001): 241. 
12 Heinbecker, “Human Security,” 5. 
13 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report, 1994, 25-33. 
14 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report, 24; Alkire, “A 
Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 13. 
15 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 17. 
13 
reform and changes need to occur in a manner that takes into account global 
inequities, the need for sustainability, and participation,16 as it is only through this 
restructuring that direct and indirect threats of violence will disappear and hence, 
there is no room for military force in this approach.  UNDP’s focus on structural 
threats and responses is a positive and potentially useful approach to global 
human security; however it is insufficient as an analytical framework through 
which to understand the illicit drug trade and the War on Drugs which include 
aspects outside of UNDP’s approach, such as the use of force.  
 
In examining UNDP’s approach to human security, I conclude that in terms of 
Bajpai’s four questions, human security seeks security for individuals, but still 
recognises that state security is important.  In terms of values, it is individual 
safety and well-being that human security is seeking to protect.  Further, threats 
under the human security paradigm consist of transnational challenges that may 
come from non-state, non-military sources.  When it comes to what means should 
be adopted to achieve this security, the UNDP report recommends restructuring 
the international community through the reform of international institutions and 
changes to both national and international policy.17  The table below summarises 
the concepts of classical security and human security (as defined by UNDP) and 
their differences. 
 
Table 1:  summary of differences between classical security and human 
security 
 Classical Security Human Security 
Security for whom? State Individuals 
Security for what values? State sovereignty and national 
security 
Individual well-being and 
safety 
Security from what threats? Other states Transnational threats from 
both military and non-military 
sources 
Security by what means? Unilateral force Cooperation and restructure of 
international community (non-
military) 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 31. 
17 Ibid., 17. 
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 The UNDP definition of human security has been criticised as being too all-
encompassing to be practical, and the means to achieve human security judged too 
idealistic, or even naïve.18  The following two sections of this chapter are 
dedicated to outlining the two different schools of thought that have emerged 
within the human security paradigm, namely freedom from want and freedom 
from fear.  These two schools of thought can be distinguished by what threats they 
are protecting individuals from, as well as by what means human security can be 
achieved.  The differences between these two schools of thought will provide the 
analytical framework for this thesis’ examination of the War on Drugs in Bolivia, 
which will then be used to show that claims that freedom from fear and freedom 
from want are interdependent are flawed.  There can be a tension between the two. 
 
2.2 The Canadian and Norwegian Approaches to Human Security 
(Freedom from Fear) 
[F]reedom from fear - which, translated into world 
terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to 
such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no 
nation will be in a position to commit an act of 
physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in 
the world. 
- U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 194119 
 
In order to ascertain how the War on Drugs in Bolivia corresponds with freedom 
from fear, we must first understand what freedom from fear entails.  “[A]n act of 
physical aggression”20 (emphasis added) is how Roosevelt defined the threat to 
freedom from fear when he addressed Congress in his 1941 State of the Union 
speech, but how does this relate to the concept of human security?  While still 
upholding the security of the individual as a referent, Canada and Norway have 
incorporated a narrower interpretation of human security into their foreign policy 
frameworks.  Both countries are considered by academics to focus on the freedom 
                                                          
18 Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 14. 
19 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “The Four Freedoms Speech,” January 6, 1941. 
20 Ibid. 
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from fear aspect of human security21 hence, by examining their approaches we 
will be able to determine how Roosevelt’s initial concept of freedom from fear 
has grown in light of the advancement of human security. 
 
According to Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, Canada 
views human security as safety from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety, or 
lives, as well as the fulfilment of an acceptable standard of living; guarantee of 
fundamental human rights; rule of law; good governance; social equity; 
sustainable development (through rules-based trade) and the protection of 
civilians (especially children) in conflict.22  Threats to these values include such 
things as intrastate conflict, state failure or decline in state control, fundamental 
freedoms and international humanitarian and human rights law, transnational 
crime, antipersonnel landmines, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflict, 
disease, mass atrocities, genocide, terrorism, and of interest to this thesis, the 
illicit drug trade.23  The key defining criteria for Canada’s version of human 
security is “vulnerability to physical violence during conflicts.”24 
 
The means used to achieve this agenda are not as ambitious as the UNDP 
approach to human security.  Rather than seeking to restructure the international 
community, Canada’s efforts are underpinned by three principles:  first, the use of 
coercion, which may include the adoption of sanctions and force (albeit in limited 
circumstances, for example when it is in partnership with others – it cannot be 
unilateral);25 second, the promotion of human security through national security 
                                                          
21 Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 21; King and 
Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” 590; Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and 
Measurement,” 18; Paris, “Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?,” 90. 
22 Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: the need for leadership,” International Journal 
LII (1997): 184; Paris, “Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?,” 90-91; Bajpai, “Human 
Security: Concept and Measurement,” 34. 
23 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 18; King and Murray, “Rethinking 
Human Security,” 590. 
24 Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 447. 
25 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 30. 
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policies; and third, cooperation between states, international organisations and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to institute norms.26 
 
Canada is not alone in its perception of human security, as Norway shares the 
same approach.27  The two countries are unified in a ‘human security 
partnership’,28 which brings them together  
in concerted efforts to promote human security, leading the way for the 
global community in specific issues such as the international ban on anti-
personnel landmines, prevention of child labor, control of proliferation of 
small arms, efforts to help war-affected children, the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court, as well as promoting general respect for 
human rights and conflict prevention.29 
 
These identified shared issues bring us back to Roosevelt’s definition regarding 
acts of physical aggression.  A review of these identified issues reveals that they 
can be divided into two categories, namely, physical threats caused by violence 
and/or conflict, and human rights, with particular regard to women and children’s 
rights.  This classification of issues is shown in the table below: 
 
Table 2: classification of issues identified by the Canadian & Norwegian 
approaches to human security 
Physical Threats Human Rights Threats 
• International ban on anti-personnel 
landmines 
• Control of proliferation of small 
arms 
• Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court 
• Conflict prevention 
• Prevention of child labour 
• Efforts to help war-affected children 
• Promoting general respect for 
human rights 
 
We can see here that freedom from fear is still very much concerned with the 
physical aggression that Roosevelt mentioned and nearly all of the threats are 
conflict-related.  However instead of a fear of physical aggression against a 
                                                          
26 Ibid., 19-20. 
27 Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 445. 
28 Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 445-446; Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for 
Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 21. 
29 Norway's Official Site in Canada, http://norwayportal.mfa.no/en/Norway---the-official-site-in-
Canada/News_and_events/norwaycanada/history/history/. 
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neighbouring nation, human security speaks with regard to individuals.  In terms 
of UNDP’s seven human security dimensions, it can be seen that Canada and 
Norway’s human security risks are closely related to the UNDP indicators of 
personal security (freedom from physical harm) and political security (freedom 
from state oppression); although, they are placed in a context of conflict.  
Freedom from fear dictates that human security is about the prioritisation of 
personal and political security in situations of conflict.  However, freedom from 
fear based approaches, such as those set out by Canada and Norway, fail to 
account for the other five UNDP human security dimensions and do little to 
explain the relevance of human security to every day life.  In the following section 
I will explore this notion further by examining the concept of freedom from want 
and determining what it entails. 
 
2.3 UNDP’s Human Development Paradigm and the Japanese Approach 
(freedom from want) 
[F]reedom from want - which, translated into world 
terms, means economic understandings which will 
secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its 
inhabitants - everywhere in the world. 
- U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 194130 
 
Now that we have determined the meaning of freedom from fear, it is essential 
that we consider freedom from want if we are to understand how freedom from 
fear relates to freedom from want with regard to the War on Drugs in Bolivia.  In 
his ‘Four Freedoms’ speech, President Roosevelt defined freedom from want as 
“economic understandings”,31 but like his definition of freedom from fear, what 
does this actually mean in terms of human security?  In another speech in 1941 
(this time at an International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference) President 
Roosevelt “speaking of the principle of ‘freedom from want’, proclaimed the 
welfare of the ‘common man’ in every country as the objective of the present 
struggle and stated that, without such a policy, individual freedom cannot 
                                                          
30 Roosevelt, “The Four Freedoms Speech.” 
31 Ibid. 
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survive”32 (emphasis added).  Therefore, from President Roosevelt, we get the 
idea that freedom from want is about economic understanding and welfare.  This 
is echoed in the UNDP human security dimension of economic security (assured 
basic income and freedom from poverty).  The question is now: is freedom from 
want just about economic security, or does it encompass more than that?   
 
According to the Canadian interpretation of human security, “human security is 
freedom from fear, and human development is freedom from want.”33  The human 
development paradigm has been institutionalised through UNDP and its human 
development index, which since 1990 has ranked countries according to the 
welfare of individuals and not just the macro-economy.34  At its core, human 
development is about expanding people’s choices35 and hence, takes into account 
a very broad range of factors that are based on the idea of basic needs, such as, 
shelter, environmental integrity, health, education, food, sanitation, and human 
rights.36  Failed or inadequate human development can lead to poverty, hunger, 
disease or the perpetual existence of disparities between various social groups or 
regions.37  Based on this, the UNDP human development paradigm adds a lot 
more to our freedom from want definition.  Like Roosevelt’s definition, economic 
security of the individual is vital, but the human development paradigm also 
opens up a new social dimension to the agenda.  Therefore, in addition to 
economic security, the human development paradigm encompasses food, health 
and environmental security, which provides freedom from want with a much 
wider scope than freedom from fear. 
 
                                                          
32 Imre Ferenczi, “Freedom from Want and International Relations Policy,” American 
Sociological Review 8, no. 5 (October 1943): 541. 
33 King and Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” 590. 
34 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 8. 
35 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report, 23. 
36 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report, 1990, 10-11, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1990_en_chap1.pdf, accessed 13 February 2010. 
37 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report, 23. 
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The clearest example of a freedom from want model of human security can be 
found in the Japanese approach.  In practice, the Japanese approach is the broadest 
and more inclusive definition of human security: it does not prioritise freedom 
from fear over freedom from want because it considers both to be equal objectives 
of human security.38  As a result, Japan’s approach to human security covers all 
threats to human survival, day-to-day life and human dignity.39  For instance, 
Japan’s interpretation of human security is stated in its Diplomatic Blue Book as 
follows: “[h]uman security comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten 
human survival, daily life and dignity – for example, environmental degradation, 
violation of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, [the outflow 
of]40 refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines and other infectious diseases 
such as AIDS – and strengthens efforts to confront these threats.”41  Amitav 
Acharya seeks to explain this occurrence by asserting that Japan’s notion of 
human security has been shaped by “the widespread poverty, unemployment, and 
social dislocation”42 caused by the economic crises of the 1990s and once more 
emphasises the importance of economic security.  However, in terms of UNDP’s 
seven dimensions, this statement draws out concerns for not only economic 
security, but also environmental, food, health and community43 security (on top of 
political and personal security), which reinforce the relevance of UNDP’s human 
development paradigm to human security.  As I will show in this thesis, the 
threats addressed by the Japanese approach can occur as a result of security 
measures driven by a freedom from fear approach to human security. 
 
                                                          
38 Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 21. 
39 Ibid. 
40 As interpreted by Ibid. 
41 “Diplomatic Blue Book 1999, Chapter II, Section 3,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 
www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/other/bluebook/1999/II-3-a.html. 
42 Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 450. 
43 Community security in the name of cultural dignity and the physical safety of cultural and 
ethnic groups can be inferred through the reference to ‘dignity’.  This is consistent to article 22 of 
the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which determines the protection 
of economic, social and cultural rights indispensable to the dignity and personality development of 
an individual. 
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Table 3: cumulative definition of freedom from want 
Source Definition 
Roosevelt – State of the Union speech (1941) Economic understanding 
Roosevelt – ILO speech (1941) Welfare 
UNDP human development paradigm Shelter/environmental integrity 
• Health  
• Education 
• Food 
• Sanitation 
• Human rights 
Japanese approach Human survival, daily life and dignity 
through (but not limited to): 
• Environmental integrity 
• Freedom from crime 
• Human rights 
• Freedom from poverty 
• Freedom from physical harm 
• Freedom from disease 
 
Freedom from want has grown from its early economic focus (as defined by 
Roosevelt) through the human development paradigm and its implementation in 
Japanese foreign policy, to reach an approach that is markedly different from the 
conflict-centric approach that defines its counterpart, freedom from fear.  Instead, 
freedom from want is mainly concerned with the every day needs required to 
ensure the day-to-day welfare, dignity and general well-being of individuals.  The 
next section will compare these two concepts in more detail. 
 
2.4 Freedom from Fear versus Freedom from Want 
 
The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts.  The 
first is the security front where victory spells freedom 
from fear.  The second is the economic and social front 
where victory means freedom from want. 
- US Secretary of State, 194544 
 
The examples discussed in this chapter illustrate the two key schools of thought 
that have emerged when it comes to implementing human security.  They are 
‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.  Both schools agree that human 
                                                          
44 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report, 24. 
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security is about shifting the focus of security beyond the security and integrity of 
states to encompass the safety and well-being of individuals.  They also see 
threats to security as transnational in nature; leading to both direct and indirect 
violence.  However, freedom from fear and freedom from want noticeably part 
ways when it comes to what threats to protect individuals from and by what 
means. 
 
When it comes to threats, freedom from fear is a narrow definition of human 
security as it limits human security to protecting individuals from physical 
violence and human rights abuses relating to situations of conflict.  As Alexandra 
Amouyel states, for the freedom from fear definition of human security “the focus 
is on the individual, but the threats remain of military and physical nature.”45  This 
approach contends that by limiting the focus of human security, the human 
security agenda is more realistic and manageable.  A freedom from fear approach 
sees the freedom from want approach as not easily transferable to policy, while 
more direct threats to human security, such as violence and human rights abuses, 
are.  The freedom from fear approach upholds that if these threats can be dealt 
with, they will create a pathway for the resolution of others.  For Canada and 
Norway, the core value of human security is freedom from threats to people’s 
rights, safety and lives - in other words - freedom from fear.46 In terms of UNDP’s 
seven dimensions, freedom from fear’s concentration on protection from physical 
violence and human rights abuses reflects personal and political security.47 
 
On the other hand, freedom from want is a broad definition that focuses human 
security on providing individuals with access to basic economic and social 
welfare opportunities that enable dignity, and the ability to mitigate the effects of 
natural disasters.48 The rationale for this approach is that hunger, disease and 
natural disasters “kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism 
                                                          
45 Amouyel, “What is Human Security?,” 13. 
46 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 18. 
47 Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” 240. 
48 Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 13. 
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combined.”49 In terms of UNDP’s seven dimensions, freedom from want’s 
concentration on providing and protecting social and economic welfare 
opportunities and dignity reflects economic, environmental, food, health and 
community security.50  Therefore, it can be argued that in comparison to freedom 
from fear, which is about direct physical violence, freedom from want is about 
‘structural violence’.51 
 
Finally, although both approaches see states, international organisations and 
NGOs working together to promote norms that reflect notions of human 
security,52 the two differ when discussing the means for achieving human security.  
Bajpai refers to freedom from fear as “promoting political development” because 
it views states (through their domestic policies) and international institutions as 
norms at the forefront of any human security success.53 It also recognises that at 
times, force or sanctions will need to be relied upon to impose this change in 
behaviour.  Therefore freedom from fear is concerned with changing the way 
actors act within the international community.  Alternatively, Bajpai refers to 
freedom from want as “promoting human development” because of its advocacy 
for basic needs, equity and participation at all levels within and across the 
international community.54 It is therefore concerned with changing the structure of 
the international community (consistent with UNDP’s approach). 
                                                          
 
49 “What is Human Security?,” http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/lie/files/Publications/what_is_HS.pdf. 
50 Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” 240. 
51 Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 447. 
52 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 31. 
53 Ibid., 36. 
54 Ibid. 
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Table 4: summary of differences between freedom from fear and freedom 
from want 
 Freedom from Fear Freedom from Want 
Security for whom? Individuals 
Security for what values? Individual safety and well-being 
Security from what 
threats? 
Transnational threats from state and non-state actors 
Particular focus on threats to 
physical safety and human 
rights of individuals, 
especially in times of 
conflict 
 
Threats to personal and 
political security 
 
Negative freedom 
 
Physical violence 
Particular focus on threats to 
economic and social welfare 
and dignity of individuals in 
every day life 
 
Threats to economic, 
environmental, food, health 
and community security 
 
Positive freedom 
 
Structural violence 
Security by what means? 
Promoting political 
development: international 
norms/institutions and use of 
sanctions/force (not 
unilateral) 
Promoting human 
development: basic needs, 
equity and greater 
participation 
 
The above table summarises the differences between freedom from fear and 
freedom from want.  From this we can conclude in terms of Bajpai’s four 
questions that with regard to whom security should be for and what values 
security should be for, freedom from fear and freedom from want are in accord 
with one another.  On the other hand, when it comes to threats, the two focus on 
different types, whereby freedom from fear concentrates on threats to physical 
safety and human rights (echoing personal and political security), and freedom 
from want concentrates on threats to social and economic well-being and dignity 
(echoing economic, environmental, food, health and community security).  
Furthermore, freedom from fear and freedom from want differ with regard to what 
means should be adopted to achieve human security.  Here, freedom from fear 
opts for ‘political development’, whereas freedom from want takes the option of 
‘human development’.   
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In spite of these distinctions, literature on human security states that no matter 
what perspective is taken on human security, both freedom from want and 
freedom from fear are hardly irreconcilable because people “fear poverty and 
destitution” as much as they “want peace and police protection.”55  The 
governments of Japan56 and Canada,57 as well as organisations such as the 
UNDP,58 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO),59 and the Human Security Report Project,60 and academics such as 
Newman,61 Acharya,62 Bajpai,63 and Sandro Calvani, Director of United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), consider that 
despite their differences the two freedoms are complementary to each other, rather 
than contradictory: “we recognize that the concepts of Freedom from Want and 
Freedom from Fear are inextricably linked, mutually reinforcing and must go 
hand in hand.”64  Calvani also states that freedom from fear is a determinant of 
freedom from want, “Freedom from Fear must be taken just as much into 
consideration, or Wants will never be quelled.”65 However, the way the War on 
Drugs is fought in Bolivia indicates that this may not always be the case.  
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2.5 Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want in the Context of the 
War on Drugs in Bolivia 
By using the human security paradigm set out in this chapter as a framework for 
analysis, this thesis will use the War on Drugs in Bolivia to illustrate that the 
differences between these two ideas can lead them to be in direct conflict with 
each other; and that the pursuit of freedom from fear can sometimes be at the 
detriment to freedom from want.  Freedom from fear and freedom from want 
differ from each other in two key ways.  First, in terms of the types of threats they 
seek to protect individuals from.  Second, by the means they adopt to counter 
these threats. 
 
Freedom from fear has a particular focus on threats to the physical safety and 
human rights of individuals, most especially in times of conflict.  These interests 
most closely correlate with UNDP’s dimensions of personal and political security, 
but can otherwise be determined as a negative freedom in the sense that it strives 
to achieve an absence of physical or political oppression.  A freedom from fear 
model involves adopting means that promote political development either through 
the development and promotion of international norms or institutions, the use of 
sanctions and sometimes the use of non-unilateral force. 
 
Freedom from want, alternatively, concentrates on threats to the social and 
economic well-being and dignity of individuals on a day-to-day basis.  This 
interest most corresponds to UNDP’s dimensions of economic, environmental, 
food, health and community security.  Therefore, freedom from want can be 
considered as a positive freedom because these dimensions enable individuals to 
have and create opportunities for themselves.  It is also structural in that it relates 
to the way the current world order harms individuals through inequitable 
arrangements.  A freedom from want model embraces means that promote human 
development, such as generating initiatives that ensure opportunities to basic 
needs, creating equity and thus, greater participation in the world system. 
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The differences between freedom from fear and freedom from want approaches to 
human security creates a tension that, while not always immediately obvious, can 
be to the detriment of human security overall.  The active pursuit of freedom from 
fear can inadvertently undermine or damage freedom from want, as will be shown 
in this thesis’ analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia.  This thesis will use this 
tension as an analytical framework to examine and analyse the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia.   To provide context for the analysis, the following chapter will examine 
the War on Drugs in Bolivia through the lens of human security. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE WAR ON DRUGS IN BOLIVIA THROUGH THE 
LENS OF HUMAN SECURITY 
In order to understand the contention between freedom from fear and freedom 
from want in the War on Drugs in Bolivia, we need to better understand the 
War on Drugs.  This chapter will provide a background to this war in order to 
demonstrate that even though the participants do not consider the War on Drugs in 
light of human security (in that they do not use the terminology), it is nevertheless 
appropriate, useful and productive to look at the War on Drugs through the 
heuristic device of human security.  To do this, we will refer back to Bajpai’s four 
questions: security for whom, for what values, from what threats, and, by what 
means?  We will explore these questions more in turn below and by doing so, we 
will be able to see that human security provides a broader perspective to the 
War on Drugs in Bolivia than a classical security approach can enable.  
Furthermore, by framing the War on Drugs through these four questions, we will 
not only see the heuristic value of examining the War on Drugs through a human 
security framework, but that the War on Drugs exemplifies a freedom from fear 
approach to security.   
 
3.1 The War on Drugs: security for whom, and for what values? 
The War on Drugs is a response to the impact that the illicit drug industry has 
upon individuals and their communities from both producer- and consumer-
countries.  As such, the goal of the War on Drugs (to protect individuals and their 
communities from the impact of the illicit drug industry by eradicating drugs) is 
compatible with the human security value of protecting the safety and well-being 
of individuals.  For example, Bertram et al. provide that drug abuse poses a threat 
to Americans as more Americans are now addicted to hard drugs than in the 1970s 
when Nixon declared a War on Drugs66 during a press conference.67  Eduardo A. 
Gamarra adds that the US loses between USD60 to 80 billion a year through 
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“through absenteeism, inefficiency, embezzlement, non-productivity and medical 
expenses” relating to the illicit drug trade.68  Meanwhile, in Bolivia the illicit drug 
trade impacts upon physical safety, well-being and human rights of Bolivians, as 
well as their environmental integrity and food and health access.  This focus on 
the interests of the individual sees the War on Drugs as analogous to the human 
security principle of using the individual as the security referent.  Furthermore, the 
goal of the War on Drugs – to eradicate illicit drugs and the illicit drug trade – 
reflects human security’s value of safeguarding individual safety and well-being. 
 
3.2 The War on Drugs: security from what threats? 
Justification for the War on Drugs is grounded outside of ‘classical’ security 
concepts, in a range of threats to individuals and communities associated with the 
illicit drug trade, primarily: crime, violence, corruption, threats to health and food 
access, and environmental degradation.  The impact of these threats to people in 
both producer- and consumer-countries underlie the perception of the illicit drug 
trade as a human security issue.  Furthermore, an examination of the key threats, 
which the War on Drugs is concerned with, shows that they are comparable to 
those of freedom from fear.  In other words, the War on Drugs can be deemed to 
be primarily concerned with threats to personal and political security, although it 
also accounts for threats to environmental, food and health security. 
 
Direct violence and crime are the most visible threats to personal security that 
emerge from the illicit drug trade as they clearly threaten the physical safety and 
well-being of individuals.69  In order to conduct their business affairs, drug 
traffickers frequently resort to violence and crime, which has led to the murders of 
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Sanabria (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 245. 
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policy makers, judges, soldiers, policemen and innocent bystanders.70  Violence 
and crime associated with the illicit drug trade impacts on both individual and 
community levels and are disruptive to societies and states. 
 
Another adverse side-effect of the illicit drug trade is an increase in corruption.71 
Daniel Caezas, the Chairman of the Bolivian Senate’s Commission on Drug 
Trafficking said:  “‘There is a serious risk that the armed forces could be 
corrupted by the cancer of drug trafficking…This is too dangerous for such an 
important institution as the military, which has the responsibility of protecting 
us.’”72  Corruption can also destabilise democratic institutions and national 
security.73  Cornelius Friesendorf argues “traffickers bribe politicians, judges, and 
the police, and thereby undermine state accountability and legitimacy.”74  The 
US administration presents the illicit drug trade as the major threat to democracy 
in the South America region75 and the War on Drugs is justified on the grounds of 
protecting this democracy.76  Corruption, and its impact on democracy, 
demonstrates another association between the War on Drugs and human security 
as democracy is an important component to good governance, which enables 
political security; a key focus of freedom from fear approaches. 
 
The impacts of the illicit drug trade are not always viable, nor immediately clear.  
The War on Drugs is also justified on issues relating to health and food access as 
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well as environmental degradation, and the impact that the illicit drug trade has on 
them.  Even though these issues are normally considered to be dimensions of 
freedom from want, in the case of the War on Drugs, these issues are addressed 
because of the impact that they have on individuals’ physical safety and well-
being (a freedom from fear concern).  This is as opposed to an approach towards 
human development or human dignity (a freedom from want concern). 
 
The chemicals used to produce illicit drugs (like cocaine) present yet another 
example of the destructive impact that the illicit drug trade can have.  This 
example also helps to show the link between the War on Drugs and human 
security’s pursuit for health security as these chemicals can lead to debilitating 
health implications.  For example, pisadores or pisacocas who are hired to stamp 
on the coca leaves during the cocaine paste making process can spend around 
seven hours a day walking on “toxic mulch”.77  While this task earns them 
30 Bolivianos (around USD6), they typically end up “crippled from standing in 
acid and brain-damaged from the fumes.”78 
 
Food security is another similarity between the War on Drugs and human security.  
One of the justifications for the War on Drugs is that the money associated with 
growing illicit crops simply encourages people to stop growing food crops and as 
a result, malnutrition is on the rise.79  In addition to this, because the land is so 
poor and infertile in Bolivia, it is difficult to cultivate anything on land that has 
previously grown crops.  In the search for new land to cultivate, deforestation is 
occurring in the Amazon in order to make room for illicit crops and this also 
“threatens the food security of the region’s inhabitants”80 (as well as 
environmental security, see below). 
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These threats to food security, loss of nutrients in the soil as well as the clearing 
of land to plant coca, can also be seen as environmental issues and hence reflect 
environmental security threats.  According to Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry 
Sanabria, the US Information Agency claims that coca growing exhausts the soil 
of nutrients, therefore making it unsuitable for any other crops.81  In addition, 
deforestation leads to the “loss of plant species, destruction of wildlife habitats, 
and the burning of trees remove protection for the soil”,82 which in turn also leads 
to a loss of nutrients in the soil. 
 
The chemicals used in the production of drugs such as cocaine have also 
destroyed sensitive natural habitats.83  According to Hans Salm and Máximo 
Liberman, the disposal of chemicals used to make cocaine paste and cocaine 
hydrochloride is one of the main threats the illicit drug trade has to the 
environment.  This is because the left-over chemical products required for 
producing cocaine pollute the soil and water: “the most serious environmental 
problem of coca lies not with its cultivation but with environmental contamination 
that results from the use of chemicals employed in the processing of coca leaves 
in the elaboration of coca paste.”84 
 
From the above, it can be seen that the War on Drugs is not concerned with 
security in the classical sense because the illicit drug trade goes beyond threats to 
state territory.  The illicit drug trade is linked to organised crime, violence and 
corruption and thereby jeopardises the physical safety and human rights of 
individuals (which otherwise, as seen in Chapter 2, can be referred to as personal 
and political security).  On top of personal and political security, there are also 
wider implications relating to food, health and environmental security.  Hence, 
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justifications for the War on Drugs identify negative side-effects of the illicit drug 
industry that are analogous to threats to human security, specifically the personal, 
political, environmental, food and health dimensions.  Also as stated by Kai 
Ambos, proponents of the War on Drugs state that it “leads to the defense of 
individual freedom rights.”85  Therefore, the security threats that the War on 
Drugs seeks to counter are those defined by human security, rather than the 
‘classical security’ model.  Not only this, but in particular, the War on Drugs is 
justified above all else, on goals that are more akin to personal and political 
security than the other seven UNDP dimensions, and this is typical of a freedom 
from fear approach.  Additionally, even the label of ‘war’ that the War on Drugs 
has, denotes freedom from fear tendencies as it may be recalled from Chapter 2 
that freedom from fear has a focus on threats to physical safety and human rights, 
especially in times of conflict.  
 
Now that we understand the War on Drugs in terms of protecting the physical 
safety and human rights of individuals (and communities) from human security-
type threats, we need to understand the War on Drugs in terms of freedom from 
fear and freedom from want.  But, in order to do this, we first need to better 
understand how the War on Drugs has been waged in Bolivia.  
 
3.3 The War on Drugs: security by what means? 
On a global level, there are a number of participants in the War on Drugs, but in 
Bolivia, the key participants are the UN, the US government and the Bolivian 
government.  Chapter 2 demonstrated that the means adopted for a freedom from 
fear approach include coercion through the non-unilateral use of sanctions and 
force.  In this section, we will look at each of these methods as they are adopted in 
the War on Drugs through examples from the UN’s, the US’ and Bolivia’s efforts, 
and by doing so, we will see how the war is conceived of and implemented as a 
freedom from fear approach. 
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(a) The Use of Sanctions 
Sanctions are a core tool to the freedom from fear approach to human security, 
and they have been used repeatedly in, and against Bolivia.  The illicit drug trade 
has been an issue on the global agenda since well before the end of World War II, 
however it was after World War II that the international community (with the US 
playing a prominent role) began participating on a multilateral level in both the 
creation and implementation of a number of UN conventions.86  Cornelius 
Friesendorf has shown that: 
After World War II, the US lobbied successfully for a prohibition regime in 
the framework of the UN.  The international drug control system is based on 
three conventions: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 
1972 amendment, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 
1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances.87 
 
The purpose of the 1961 and 1971 treaties are “to codify internationally applicable 
control measures to not only ensure that narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances do not get diverted to illicit channels,”88 but also to ensure that they are 
available for medical and scientific purposes.  The 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs includes the coca leaf (from which cocaine is derived) as one of 
the substances to be controlled under the treaty.89  Specifically, Article 49(1)(c) 
stipulates that a party to the treaty may reserve the right to temporarily allow coca 
leaf chewing within its territory, however this is subject to Article 49(2)(e).90 
Article 49(2)(e) states that coca chewing must be abolished within 25 years of the 
treaty coming into force.91  Both the 1961 and 1971 treaties also include general 
provisions on trafficking and drug abuse.92  The 1971 convention was established 
to deal with psychoactive substances as the 1961 convention is restricted to coca, 
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opium and cannabis related drugs.  The 1988 treaty provides additional measures 
for enforcing the 1961 and 1971 treaties.93  These three conventions are the major 
international treaties in force to address the global illicit drug issue and together 
give the first indication of the collective use of sanctions to the War on Drugs.  
The UN drug treaties approach drugs, including coca, as threats to the physical 
safety and well being of individuals and communities, thereby conceiving drugs 
as a threat to freedom from fear, as opposed to freedom from want. 
 
In terms of US anti-drug efforts, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 was one of the 
first pieces of US legislation to provide rewards of foreign assistance and 
favourable access to the US market for drug-producing and transit countries that 
adopt US anti-drug initiatives.  Aware that their approach was being undermined 
by corruption, the US government established the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, under 
which Congress requires the US president to annually determine whether a 
country has been appropriately cooperative with America’s anti-drugs effort.94  If 
a country is ‘certified’ then it is rewarded.  On the other hand, if the president 
‘decertifies’ a country, or if Congress overturns the president’s certification, this 
could lead to the suspension of US aid (except that relating to counter-narcotics 
and humanitarian support).  Decertification could also mean the prevention of 
receiving loans from organisations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or 
the World Bank, the end of preferential tariff treatment, restrictions on air traffic 
between the US and the affected country, increased duties on the country’s 
exports to the US, and it might also mean facing full sanctions.95  This is another 
example of where we can see the collective (or non-unilateral) use of sanctions as 
certification plays an important economic tool for the fight in the War on Drugs.  
As Friesendorf says, it has “been a powerful means for influencing the policies 
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and politics of states such as Bolivia, whose economy is highly dependent on US 
aid.”96 
 
The Andean Trade Preference Act is an act that operates in a similar vein to the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act.  Passed in 1990, under the guidance and support of 
President George H. W. Bush and his appointed Drug Czar, William Bennett,97 
the Andean Trade Preference Act 1990 provided a tariff-exemption programme 
for Andean nations.  This piece of legislation gave (and still gives) South 
America’s cocaine-producing and transit countries98 preferential access to the US 
market.  It does this by allowing these countries to export thousands of products to 
the US free of duty.  The intention behind the Andean Trade Preference Act is to 
give producer-countries an incentive to fight the War on Drugs.  However, any 
benefit under this programme is subject to the countries meeting certain criteria 
and considerations.  These criteria and considerations include whether a country is 
a communist country, whether it gives preferential treatment to the products of 
another developed country, as well as whether it meets the narcotics cooperation 
certification criteria (mentioned above).99  Like the certification process, 
compliance with these criteria is verified on an annual basis and failure to meet 
these standards leads to a loss of trade-exemption privileges.  The US’ array of 
sanctions are a response to the freedom from fear driven perception of drugs as a 
threat to the physical safety and well-being of individuals and communities in 
consumer-countries.  Little consideration appears to have been given to the 
economic impacts of the sanctions thus risking the freedom from want of 
communities in producer-countries in favour of seeking freedom from fear in 
consumer-countries.  
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In addition to the UN and US’ anti-drug efforts (by way of sanctions) it is worth 
mentioning two examples where Bolivia has adopted sanctions into its domestic 
law, which are consistent with the UN and US approach.  Specifically, according 
to Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Bolivia has “passed laws, created institutions 
and adopted antinarcotics strategies shaped by U.S. concerns.”100  Examples of 
these are the Law of Coca and Controlled Substances (Ley del Régimen de la 
Coca y Sustancias Controladas, but otherwise known as Ley or Law 1008) and 
Plan Dignity.   
 
The Bolivian government in July 1988 adopted Law 1008.  This piece of 
legislation is a good example of the non-unilateral use of both sanctions and force, 
as described by the freedom from fear approach to human security.  As provided 
by Ellen C. Leichtman, the enactment of Law 1008 was not solely due to Bolivia 
acting alone as “the US played a major role in the passage of [Law] 1008.”101  
With regard to the use of sanctions, Law 1008 was established to broaden the 
powers of the Bolivian police force and military in order to assist them to better 
enforce coca eradication policies.  Law 1008 provided for voluntary eradication of 
crops planted before 1988 and voluntary eradication was complemented by 
alternative development.  This piece of legislation also created a special drug 
court, special drug prosecutors and an anti-drug police force.102 
 
One of the most notable acts of coercion through the threat of sanctions occurred 
in late 1997.  In response to US pressure in the form of threats to cut foreign 
assistance, the former military dictator and newly constitutionally-elected 
president, Hugo Suarez Banzer developed and committed himself to Plan Dignity 
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(Plan Dignidad),103 which then became supported by the US through financial, 
military and intelligence assistance.104  From 1998, the government implemented 
this aggressive eradication campaign, which had the aim of eliminating illegal 
coca cultivation (in other words, coca cultivation areas outside of those classified 
as Zone One under Law 1008) within five years.105  Like Law 1008, Plan Dignity 
is another example of Bolivian legislation that combines the use of sanctions and 
force.  However, the difference between Plan Dignity and Law 1008 is that 
instead of focusing on individuals, Plan Dignity focused on communities by 
offering community compensation for voluntary eradication,106 which after five 
years would no longer be available.107  In order to carry out this agenda, Plan 
Dignity further broadened military power to make forced eradication and 
interdiction (through the destruction of fábricas) possible.108 
 
The range of sanctions discussed in this section, both domestic and foreign, are 
valid to a freedom from fear approach to security.  The use of sanctions in the 
context of the War on Drugs in Bolivia is also relevant to the wider concept of 
human security because these sanctions are in place for a non-state (that is to say a 
non-classical security threat) – the illicit drug trade. 
 
(b) The Use of Non-Unilateral Force 
The violent consequences of the illicit drug trade necessitate some element of 
force in order to meet the threats produced by the industry.  The use of force as 
part of the War on Drugs is of relevance to this thesis as it is non-unilateral, and 
therefore in line with a freedom from fear approach to human security.  The use of 
non-unilateral force became apparent in the War on Drugs in 1986, with the US-
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led on-the-ground programmes in Bolivia (and various other parts of the Andes).  
Examples of these programmes are, Operations Black Furnace and Snow Cap, 
which were cooperative operations between the US and Bolivia.  As stated by 
Friesendorf:  
in July 1986, the administration sent around 160 army personnel, six Black 
Hawk helicopters, and equipment to Bolivia.  In the framework of the four-
month Operation Black Furnace, US personnel cooperated with Bolivian 
security forces in the destruction of cocaine laboratories in the Beni and 
Santa Cruz regions and in the arrest of traffickers.  In spring 1987, the US 
launched another anti-drug campaign, Operation Snowcap.109 
 
Both operations, Blast Furnace and Snowcap, were designed to eradicate coca 
crops from the Bolivian jungles.110  This was in an effort to disrupt the production 
and trafficking of cocaine.  In these operations, the US military and Bolivian 
security forces destroyed cocaine laboratories (fábricas) and coca crops, arrested 
drug traffickers and confiscated drugs.111 
 
Another example of non-unilateral use of force is the Air Bridge Denial Program, 
which operated from the late 1980s to 2001, and involved the shooting down of 
aircraft suspected of trafficking illicit drugs.  The thinking behind the Air Bridge 
Denial Program was based on the premise that (at least until the mid-1990s) a 
majority of the world’s coca was grown in Bolivia and Peru, however most of the 
cocaine refinement took place in Colombia.112  In order for this to happen, coca 
leaves were turned into coca paste (or cocaine base) in the originating country 
before being transported to Colombia for the final stage of the cocaine-making 
process (which involves turning the coca paste or cocaine base into cocaine 
hydrochloride).  The most common way to transport coca paste from Bolivia (or 
Peru) was by small aircraft.  Eventually drug traffickers established a drug 
trafficking route, known as an air bridge, which was what the Air Bridge Denial 
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Program was developed to put an end to.113  The Air Bridge Denial Program was 
intended to work in two ways; first of all, by preventing the coca paste from 
getting to Colombia, the Bolivian, (and Peruvian) coca farmers (known as 
cocaleros) would lose their custom; and secondly, cocaine producers in Colombia 
would have little material to work with, which would therefore lead to a reduction 
in cocaine.114  It involved the police, military and intelligence forces from Bolivia, 
Peru and Colombia, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Coast 
Guard from the US.115  These forces worked together to: detect airstrips and 
airplanes; arrest traffickers; and interdict suspicious planes (either by seizure or 
shoot down).116  The militarised use of non-unilateral force to deny coca farmers 
of markets was aimed at strengthening the freedom from fear of producer-, as well 
as consumer-countries, by undermining the organisations responsible for the illicit 
drug trade.  However, this approach to freedom from fear was made without 
apparent consideration for the livelihoods of coca farmers, thereby endangering 
their freedom from want. 
 
These examples of non-unilateral uses of force are US-led initiatives, however the 
Bolivian government has also initiated its own forms of non-unilateral force and 
thus further illustrating the War on Drugs as characteristic of a freedom from fear 
approach.  For example, Fuerza Especial de Cucha Contra el Narcotráfico – the 
Special Force for Fighting Drug Trafficking (FELCN) was created as the 
“national elite drug force”117 to lead Bolivia’s anti-drug effort. According to 
Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabria, the FELCN is heavily influenced by 
the DEA through advice and training (although this may not be the case now) and 
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has salaries paid directly through US aid118.119   This unit consists of police 
officers, as well as officers from the navy and the air force, and it has military 
training in low-intensity conflict and operates mainly in Beni.120 
                                                          
 
Along with FELCN, Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural – Mobile Rural Patrol 
Unit, Bolivia (UMOPAR) was established as the uniformed interdiction 
component of FELCN, with paramilitary functions.  It was specifically established 
to fight the War on Drugs and is based in the Chapare.121  Tim Elliot noted, “like 
all of Bolivia’s anti-drug agencies, UMOPAR was trained and directed by the 
USA.”122  UMOPAR officers are supposed to act under the direction and in the 
presence of the special drug prosecutors, but there are only two in the Chapare 
region with about 12 to 15 patrols occurring daily.123 
 
Both FELCN and UMOPAR engage in the interdiction, search, patrol, destruction 
of fábricas, and arrest of suspects.  The Bolivian security force’s pursuit of 
criminal activity has occurred with little regard to the human rights violations 
created by the drive for higher arrests. 
 
From the examples provided in this section, it can be seen that the War on Drugs 
is not concerned with security in the classical sense because the illicit drug trade 
goes beyond the actions of nation states.  The illicit drug trade is the transnational 
threat of non-state actors, whereby responses require the cooperation of states.  In 
this instance, it is the UN, the US and the Bolivian governments working together 
to combat the coca growers and cocaine traffickers who form an inherent part of 
the cocaine drug trade.  The means that these participants have adopted to fight 
118 Although this may no longer be the case since the expulsion of the DEA from Bolivia in 
November 2008. 
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the War on Drugs are not the ‘hard power’ solutions that would otherwise 
dominate a classical security approach, but instead the use of coercion tactics 
through the use of non-unilateral sanctions and force.  In addition to the threats 
identified by the War on Drugs, the means adopted to achieve the agenda also 
demonstrate the War on Drugs as typical of a freedom from fear approach. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the War on Drugs in Bolivia is typical of a 
pursuit for human security as it seeks to free individuals from crime, violence, 
corruption, environmental degradation, and threats to food and health access, 
associated with the illicit drug trade.  Furthermore, this chapter has shown that it 
is appropriate and analytically productive to typify the War on Drugs in Bolivia 
(that involves the use of military force, coercion and sanctions to achieve its 
agenda) in terms of a policy that accords with the tenets of freedom from fear.  
Now with this background on the War on Drugs in Bolivia, we can turn to the 
case study to examine the tensions between freedom from fear and freedom from 
want as well as how a freedom from fear approach can marginalise and even 
contest freedom from want. 
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CHAPTER 4:  THE WAR ON DRUGS IN BOLIVIA AND THE TENSION 
BETWEEN FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND FREEDOM FROM WANT 
In the previous chapter we saw that the War on Drugs is justified on the basis of 
protecting the safety and well-being of individuals, with particular regard to the 
human security principles of personal and political security (although 
environmental, health and food security also have their place in the War on Drugs 
rhetoric).  We also saw that the means adopted for achieving this agenda involved 
coercion through the use of force and sanctions, which is consistent with a 
freedom from fear approach to human security. 
 
By bearing in mind what we have already uncovered, this chapter will examine 
how the War on Drugs has impacted upon the individuals of Bolivia.  By doing so 
it will become apparent that despite the desired outcome of protecting individual 
safety and well-being, the War on Drugs has actually compromised the safety and 
well-being of Bolivians.  In addition, not only has the War on Drugs failed to 
accomplish what it set out to by failing to achieve personal, political and 
environmental security, but it has also challenged freedom from want.  The War 
on Drugs in Bolivia compromises freedom from want by marginalising or 
threatening economic, community, food and health security, and thus it defies 
claims that freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary. 
Friesendorf identified some of the challenges created by the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia, noting “US coercive drug policies have made matters worse, since the 
implementation of drug prohibition creates side effects such as human rights 
abuses, a weaker control of armed forces, violent conflict, environmental 
destruction, and corruption.”124  By using the seven dimensions provided for by 
the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 to examine the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia, we can see freedom from fear and freedom from want are at odds with 
each other.  This chapter will focus on personal, political, economic, community, 
and environmental security, but it will also address health and food security to 
further demonstrate the tension between these two ideas.  It will be set out as 
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follows: first, by the use of coercion through force and sanctions, the War on 
Drugs in Bolivia threatens political, personal and environmental security; second 
and third, by typifying freedom from fear, it can be seen that the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia marginalises economic and community security, and fails to benefit from 
the holistic approach offered by freedom from want. 
 
4.1 The Means Used to Fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia Threatens its 
Own Goals of Personal, Political, and Environmental Security 
The War on Drugs in Bolivia is justified on the grounds of protecting the 
personal, political, and environmental security of individuals threatened by the 
negative side-effects of the illicit drug industry.  However, the use of coercion, 
through force and sanctions, in the War on Drugs in Bolivia has actually 
compromised these goals.   
 
(a) Personal Security 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, personal security is about freedom from crime 
as well as physical violence from the state, other states, other groups of people, 
individuals, gangs and threats to the self.  This particular dimension has a focus on 
women and children.125 
 
One of the key justifications for the War on Drugs is the need to protect 
individuals from physical violence as a result of the illicit drug trade.  However, 
even though Bolivia is the third biggest cultivator of coca in the world, Peter 
Andreas asserts that, “it has so far avoided the kind of organized armed violence 
that has defined its other drug exporting neighbours.”126  On the contrary, the War 
on Drugs strategy of forced eradication or eradication through coercion has 
actually resulted in violence and repression, which threatens the personal security 
of Bolivian peasant farmers.  For example, Plan Dignity, which was discussed in 
Chapter 3, began in 1997 as the brainchild of the former military dictator, 
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President Hugo Banzer.  As an aggressive eradication campaign, Plan Dignity was 
anything but dignified.   The aim of Plan Dignity was to abolish all illicit coca 
cultivation within five years.  The plan was heralded as a success, with claims that 
coca cultivation had been halved and cocaine production possibly reduced by a 
third,127 but this came at the cost of a loss of personal security for some, with 
numerous deaths and more than 350 farmers injured or detained.128 
 
Law 1008, which was enacted in 1988, is another example of how the War on 
Drugs in Bolivia brings violence (and repression) into the lives of the Bolivian 
peasant farming family. As stated by Linda Farthing with regard to Law 1008: 
“Law 1008 has resulted in a victimization of the poor, just as anti-drug efforts 
in the U.S. have done.  These people, who represent the majority of Bolivia’s 
population, have been subject to abuse, arbitrary arrest, a lack of due process, 
and as a result, extended incarceration, frequently for crimes they have not 
committed.”129 
 
Furthermore, by targeting those at the bottom of the socio-economic and cultural 
structure (for example rural peasant and urban poor)130 these anti-coca/anti-drug 
policies exacerbate the social, cultural and economic divide that exists between 
Bolivia’s rich and poor and thereby further threatening the personal security of the 
Bolivian population by creating instability amongst its society.   
 
From these two examples, it can be seen that the coercive and forceful tactics of 
the War on Drugs (in Bolivia) have in the process of trying to protect individuals 
from violence actually subjected them to violence, repression, human rights 
abuses and social, political and economic instability.  Additionally in contrast to 
the War on Drugs’ justification that the coca/cocaine industry creates instability, 
the War on Drugs has itself, in some cases, increased instability.  Andreas goes 
further to actually say that the coca/cocaine industry helps to bring stability 
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through the income and employment opportunities it creates:  “in some contexts, 
the revenue and employment generated by the illegal economy can even help to 
stabilize a volatile situation.”131 
 
(b) Political Security 
Political security was also discussed in Chapter 2, but to recap, political security is 
about protecting people from human rights violations and state oppression through 
good governance.  UNDP considers this value to be one of the most important 
aspects of human security.132  The 1994 UNDP report states that “one of the most 
useful indicators of political insecurity in a country is the priority the government 
accords military strength” and this “shows up in the ratio of military to social 
spending”.133 
 
(i) Human rights abuses 
The War on Drugs has been justified as seeking to uphold principles of good 
governance and individual freedom from human rights abuses and state 
oppression in Bolivia by fighting corruption, which has destabilised Bolivia’s 
democratic institutions.  Conversely however, the War on Drugs has resulted in a 
number of human rights abuses on the part of executive (including military) and 
judicial officials responsible for enforcing the War on Drugs-influenced law.  
Human rights abuses have included, but are not limited to: incarceration without 
trial, denial of bail, questionable fair trials, repressive or coercive acts, direct 
violence itself, and sometimes death.  These examples of human rights abuses are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Anyone who is accused of a crime under Law 1008 has to be imprisoned until and 
during the time of his/her trial.134  But, Law 1008 requires a three-step judicial 
process, and this process can take between two to four years before the accused 
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can be sentenced or acquitted.135  During this time, the accused is denied bail and 
the whole process has very little respect for individual rights and limited universal 
or impartial application of the rule of law.136  In response to this, Human Rights 
Watch has determined that “both the denial of pre-trial and post-acquittal release 
in Law 1008 violates internationally established protections for the right to 
personal liberty.”137  Moreover, when a case does make it to court, there is 
pressure on judicial officials to produce results through sentencing138 because any 
acquittals are regarded as suspicious.139 
 
In addition, the nature of the crimes that people are arrested for are at times 
dubious.  Every day household products, like bleach, can be used to help produce 
cocaine and under Law 1008, it is possible to arrest people for carrying these 
products (regardless of the amount).  During the crackdowns, officers who were 
concerned with increasing their arrest numbers140 targeted those individuals 
carrying personal amounts of these types of products.141  These actions also 
demonstrate how Law 1008 indirectly boosts “the powers of police and 
eradication officials to engage in increasingly violent repression in coca 
cultivating peasants and others at the lower echelons of the coca economy.”142 
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Those convicted under Law 1008 are not eligible for amnesty, pardon or a 
commutation of sentence, even though others, who have committed crimes under 
separate areas of Bolivian law, are.143  Law 1008 prisoners often spend more time 
in prison than their sentences require.  This is because of the amount of time it 
takes to run the judicial process. Even so, no compensation is made to those who 
are found innocent or who spend longer in prison than is required.144  As a direct 
result, during its first years, Law 1008 led to a massive explosion of prison 
populations.  For example, eight men and two women were imprisoned in 1987 
for coca/cocaine related offences whereas 175 men and 80 women were 
imprisoned in 1994.  These human rights abuses stem from the freedom from fear 
approach that is characteristic of the War on Drugs in Bolivia.  These examples 
therefore illustrate that despite the War on Drugs being justified on the grounds of 
protecting individuals from human rights abuses it is in fact creating them. 
 
Force and repression have had an increasingly prominent role in coca eradication 
and cocaine interdiction, especially since the establishment of Law 1008.  The 
term ‘voluntary’ eradication is deceptive because it hides the range of repressive 
acts that compel peasant farmers to ‘voluntarily’ destroy their coca.  These acts 
vary from the “use of violent, arbitrary arrests, verbal threats and other forms of 
intimidation to more subtle forms of coercion, such as claims by officials of the 
Coca Eradication Bureau that compensation funds were rapidly depleted and that 
unless growers quickly ‘volunteered’ to destroy their coca shrubs the officials 
would do it instead without compensation.”145 
 
The use of force in the War on Drugs by UMOPAR and the US DEA, Special 
Forces and other US bodies is another example where political security has been 
compromised.  Civil and human rights abuses have occurred despite force being 
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used in partnership.  For example, a study conducted by the Andean Information 
Network revealed cases against UMOPAR  
where victims had been shot, submerged under water, beaten while suspended 
in the air, burned with cigarettes, forcibly injected with unknown substances, 
tortured with electric shock, severely beaten and repeatedly threatened with 
death.  Many of these violations have occurred during interrogation, but they 
have also been committed against people neither accused of any crime nor 
arrested.146 
 
The DEA, the US Special Forces and other US-led bodies have also reportedly 
committed these abuses.  What is more, victims of these abuses have no right of 
redress through the courts as “there are no administrative or judicial mechanisms 
in place in Bolivia to demand the accountability of the anti-drug forces”147 and 
tend to come from the lower socio-economic sector of Bolivian society.148 
 
This arbitrary, repressive, violent and sometimes fatal treatment towards coca 
peasants and the failure to respect internationally accepted human rights norms of 
due process and fair and impartial trials threatens the political security of 
Bolivians.  Not only has the War on Drugs in Bolivia disregarded the notions of 
human rights and freedom from state oppression that it was established to uphold, 
but it has also failed to protect the democratic institutions it justifies itself on 
defending.  For instance, the War on Drugs is justified by the rhetoric that US 
military aid programmes and assistance “help to ensure a monopoly of state 
control over the national territory and even foster democracy, human rights, and 
military accountability.”149  On the contrary, this partnering of force in the War on 
Drugs indirectly threatens Bolivia’s democratic process.  As expressed by Hans 
Salm and Máximo Liberman, a stronger military merely weakens a democracy 
because it increases the potential for military rule.150 
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The use of force as a means to manage the threats created by the illicit drug trade, 
and indeed the conceptualisation of anti-drug trade security measures (as in the 
War on Drugs), is based on a perception of the illicit drug trade that portrays a 
freedom from fear approach.  This perception, and its resulting use of force as a 
security measure reveals a failure to conceive of the illicit drug trade as a security 
threat that results from want, rather than aggression.  
 
(ii) Threat to Bolivia’s democratic institutions 
The War on Drugs has led to a widening of the scope of military functions and a 
blurring between police and defence roles in Bolivia.  For example, in March 
1990, the Commander-in-Chief of Bolivian armed forces revealed that US 
military assistance to Bolivia was conditional upon the participation of the 
Bolivian military in the counter-narcotics effort (as part of Plan Dignity).151  This 
was the first time the Bolivian military played an active part in the counter-
narcotics effort.  Traditionally, armed forces are seen as the specialists in 
defending the nation against any attacks from foreign governments.  However, 
Bolivia was a country that had been democratic for less than 25 years at the time 
that Plan Dignity came into place and as F. G. Argañaras argued, “employing the 
Bolivian military as an agent of law enforcement against drugs and producers of 
coca leaves has brought the military directly into the civil arena in a new but no 
less worrisome guise.”152  Instead of creating a well-funded role for the Bolivian 
military, the Bolivian government should have been strengthening its democratic 
institutions.153 
 
The War on Drugs is a major threat to the development of Bolivia’s democratic 
institutions.  The training and funding of Bolivia’s police and military is essential 
to the War on Drugs’ use of force, however the Bolivian police and military have 
historically shown quite undemocratic tendencies.  As stated by Christina 
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Jacqueline Johns in Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs, “even though such 
training may decrease the rampant brutality of some units, US funding generally 
increases military control of the levers of power.  In many cases as well, training 
and funding merely make the repression more sophisticated.”154 
 
Bolivia’s democratic institutions have also been undermined by the presence of 
corruption.  As stated in Chapter 3, the abolishment of corruption is one of the 
main justifications for the War on Drugs in Bolivia.  Ironically, however, the more 
the US trained and equipped Bolivia’s enforcement agencies to fight the War on 
Drugs, the stronger the incentive became for drug traffickers to bribe them.155 
Johns explains,  
the War on Drugs has also had negative effects on police institutions in 
[Bolivia] by promoting even more questionable police tactics and even more 
widespread corruption than existed before the U.S.-initiated War on Drugs.  
DEA agents are reportedly as afraid of the police they work with in 
[Bolivia] as of the drug traffickers they are supposed to arrest.156 
Alarmingly, from this it can be seen that the more aggressively the War on Drugs 
is fought in Bolivia, the more corruption spreads. 
 
Corruption is rife amongst the government, military and police in Bolivia because 
the meagre salaries of these officers are in no position to compete against the 
bribes of the traffickers.  Friesendorf noted that: 
“In Bolivia, during the 1980s, traffickers reportedly offered Unidades Móviles 
de Patrullaje Rural (UMOPAR) officers and town officials between $15,000 and 
$25,000 for keeping quiet for 72 hours to allow small aircraft to land, pick up 
drug lords, and take off again.  Some officials due to a small salary and a 
monthly U.S. supplement ranging from $50 to $100, found it difficult to turn 
down such offers.”157 
 
Another aspect of the War on Drugs that aggravates the corruption problem in 
Bolivia is Law 1008.  It is known that any arrest under Law 1008 leads to a long-
term imprisonment (purely because of how long the judicial process takes) and 
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this knowledge can therefore be used to the advantage of corrupt officers.  For 
example: 
“[Law 1008] has enhanced corruption on the part of the police, large numbers of 
persons languish in prison awaiting trial, rural (primarily peasant) detainees 
cannot argue their cases as well as their urban (non-peasant) counterparts, and 
that virtually all of the detainees under Law 1008 are poor and face serious 
charges in a judicial structure that is notorious for its inefficiency and 
corruption.”158 
 
Therefore, despite political security being a feature in the War on Drugs through 
the notions of good governance, the use of force has led to the strengthening of 
Bolivia’s military, as well as increased incentives for corruption.  Both of which 
have led to the weakening of good governance within Bolivia.  The focus on 
strengthening the military and law enforcement aspects of Bolivia’s government, 
without an equal focus on strengthening democratic institutions and human rights, 
suggests a failure by the War on Drugs participants to understand the 
interconnected nature of today’s security threats, such as those of the illicit drug 
trade.  
 
(iii) Erosion of Bolivia’s sovereignty 
Related to the weakening of Bolivia’s good governance is the idea that the use of 
coercion (through the threat of sanctions) in the War on Drugs has eroded 
Bolivia’s state sovereignty.  The most harmful of the threats to Bolivia’s 
sovereignty seems to be the ongoing pressure on the judicial and executive branch 
(including the military) to comply with US directives.  This is despite the fact that 
these directives may directly or indirectly threaten or contradict Bolivia’s 
constitution, the will of the Bolivian people, and/or international norms of 
sovereignty (for example, the recognition of non-interference with the internal 
actions of other sovereign states).  As stated by Argañaras, “when neither the 
congress nor the Supreme Court nor the executive of a small country can operate 
independently of a superpower and key decisions are taken without consultation, 
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it follows that some political goods obtained through elections are circulating at 
less than their full value.”159 
 
Bolivia’s involvement in the War on Drugs often involves Bolivia being coerced 
to act in a manner that is inconsistent to its own interest and thereby illustrating its 
inability to protect its own sovereignty.  This vulnerability is due to Bolivia’s 
dependency on the US as well as America’s willingness to exploit this by 
threatening to let Bolivia’s participation in the War on Drugs impact US foreign 
assistance to Bolivia.160  Bolivia’s position is also weakened by its unfavourable 
place in the global economy, which makes it more vulnerable to coercion.161  
Below are some examples where Bolivia has been compelled to act in 
contradiction to its own interests. 
 
The Clinton Administration threatened to not only cut aid to Bolivia if it failed to 
eradicate set quotas of coca, but it also threatened to lobby the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank to stop loans.  In response to these threats, 
President Sanchez de Lozada said: “I can claim bitterly…it’s very embarrassing to 
be the president of the country and have these ultimatums.  It really rubs salt into 
the wounds of your independence.  But we’re in a hard position.  If we end up 
losing these funds, we’re dead.”162 
 
The use of coercion through the threat of sanctions in the War on Drugs has 
compromised Bolivia’s sovereignty and thereby impacted upon the political 
security idea of good governance.  This result, from an approach that epitomises 
freedom from fear, is in contrast with both freedom from want and freedom from 
fear itself.  Additionally, the use of coercion in the War on Drugs illustrates the 
tension between freedom from want and freedom from fear.  For example, the 
compromising of Bolivia’s sovereignty shows that the use of sanctions and 
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coercion exploit Bolivia’s vulnerability as a developing country due to its 
dependency on foreign assistance.  Further, by doing so this means of achieving 
human security exacerbates the inequities of the international structure, which is 
in direct confrontation with a freedom from want approach that attempts to 
restructure the international community in an equitable manner.   
 
In summary, by using coercion through force and sanctions, the War on Drugs 
threatens political security in terms of abusing human rights and undermining 
good governance (which includes democracy and sovereignty), which are valued 
by both freedom from want and freedom from fear.  Furthermore, these strategies, 
which typify a freedom from fear approach, have also conflicted with outcomes 
pursued by freedom from want. 
 
(c) Environmental Security 
Environmental security is about the integrity of land, air and water because this is 
what makes human habitation possible.163  Water scarcity, water pollution, 
increased pressures on land, deforestation, desertification, air pollution, and 
natural disasters have all been cited as threats to environmental security.164 
 
Protection for the environment is another rationale behind the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia and it is argued as two points.  First of all, the slash and burn techniques 
used to clear land in order to facilitate the planting of coca crops leads to the 
destruction of important ecosystems and also leads to soil erosion.  Secondly, the 
chemical run-off as the result of cocaine production leads to water and soil 
pollution.  While the second assertion is a real problem with the cocaine industry, 
this section will assert that the approaches adopted in the War on Drugs in Bolivia 
to eradicate coca crops are actually just as threatening to environmental security.  
It has been argued that coca cultivation is not as harmful to the environment as is 
claimed and that it is actually beneficial for Bolivia’s environment.  
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 To begin with, the first concern that the War on Drugs claims environmental 
security for is a red herring because the soil is so infertile in Bolivia that any new 
crops to be planted (coca and other) would involve the clearing of new land.  
Furthermore, because coca continues to produce for up to thirty years, the 
requirement to clear land for new crops is far less than that of annual crops.165  
The coca substitution and alternative development programmes, that supplement 
the War on Drugs, threaten environmental security as no other crop can be planted 
where coca (or any other crop that has been planted for a substantive period) has 
been previously because of the poor quality of the soil and nutrient depletion.  
Therefore, alternative crops need to be planted elsewhere, potentially causing 
people to move to virgin lands.  In a country like Bolivia, this only leaves the 
Amazon, which will require clearing, the removal of forest cover166 and therefore 
soil erosion.  In lieu of alternative crops, any forced eradication could also lead to 
coca cultivation spreading from the Yungas and the Chapare to other parts of 
Bolivia where coca does not currently exist.  This would also threaten other 
ecological preserves.167 
 
Furthermore, one of the key approaches to the War on Drugs in Bolivia is the 
spraying of herbicides over coca fields from low-flying aircrafts.  Unfortunately, 
as Friesendorf points out, not only do defoliants destroy coca plants, but they also 
harm other plants, as well as animals.  What is more, herbicides pollute rivers and 
soil in sensitive ecosystems.168  Another way in which the War on Drugs creates a 
threat to environmental security is through the clearing of land for the logistics of 
establishing the eradication and interdiction policies.  One example of this is the 
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Air Bridge Denial Program, which involved environmental destruction through 
the process of constructing airbases and radar stations.169 
 
As mentioned, it has been argued that coca cultivation has multiple benefits 
including characteristics of sustainable agriculture.  As James Patton says: “the 
truth, however, is that coca is more environmentally sound in numerous ways than 
many alternative crops.”170  Firstly, coca plants provide shelter to protect the soil 
from wind or rain erosion.  Moreover, as the coca plant grows, its roots help to 
keep the soil in place and its leaves help to provide shelter from sun, water and 
wind erosion.  This cover also makes coca ideal for inter-planting. Alternative 
crops usually leave portions of the plant behind that need to be burnt, and this 
technique destroys any remaining nutrients in the soil, however, this does not 
happen with coca (at least not until the plant has stopped producing crop).  Coca is 
also highly resistant to flooding171 as well as high levels of dissolved aluminium, 
which is present in soils that lack nutrients (such as in Bolivia).172  Therefore, coca 
is the ideal crop for both Bolivia’s agricultural and economic climate, thus making 
it the perfect tool for development.173  Secondly, coca does not rely on an annual 
regrowth cycle, unlike other crops, and this, (contrary to what has been argued by 
proponents of the War on Drugs), actually reduces the drain on the soil’s 
nutrients.  As stated by Hans Salm and Máximo Liberman, “[t]he depletion of soil 
nutrients by coca…annually removes five times less nitrogen, seven times less 
phospherous, and fifteen times less potassium than maize, an annual crop.  This 
far less degrading use of soil nutrients is what allows the continuous production of 
coca.”174  The traditional coca cultivation method of building terraces that is used 
in the Yungas protects the soil from erosion by preventing rain water and nutrient 
                                                          
169 Ibid., 119. 
170 Patton, “Counterdevelopmnent and the Bolivian Coca War,” 8. 
171 Salm and Liberman, “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation,” 221. 
172 Ibid., 219. 
173 Patton, “Counterdevelopmnent and the Bolivian Coca War,” 8. 
174 Salm and Liberman, “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation,” 218. 
56 
run-off.  Finally, other export crops (for example, cotton) require large volumes of 
chemical fertiliser and pesticides, which can also reduce the soil’s nutrients.175  
 
To summarise, environmental security illustrates that the means adopted for 
fighting the War on Drugs in Bolivia can actually have a devastating impact on 
the environment.  This in turn demonstrates the tension between freedom from 
fear and freedom from want in that by failing to take an holistic approach to 
human security, a freedom from fear approach compromises the other dimensions 
of human security such as, food and health (discussed later in this chapter).  Also, 
by having political and personal security as its key focal points, the strategies 
adopted to fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia can even negatively impact upon the 
environmental security it is claiming to protect. 
 
This section has demonstrated that the means adopted to pursue the personal, 
political and environmental security goals of the War on Drugs in Bolivia have 
had the unintended consequence of threatening these very goals.  This result 
illustrates a lack of understanding of the context as well as a lack of appreciation 
of the interdependent nature of the human security dimensions, particularly in 
light of environmental and political security. 
 
4.2 The War on Drugs in Bolivia Marginalises Economic, Community, 
Food and Health Security 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, by typifying freedom from fear, the War 
on Drugs in Bolivia marginalises economic and community security, which are 
components of freedom from want.  This section demonstrates how freedom from 
fear and freedom from want are at tension with one another by discussing how the 
marginalisation and neglect of economic and community security leads to the 
insecurity of these two dimensions.  
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(a) Economic Security 
Economic security is not a justification for the War on Drugs in Bolivia, however 
its absence is pertinent to illustrating the tension between freedom from fear and 
freedom from want.  Economic security is about ensuring that individuals enjoy 
an assured income either through access to employment/livelihood opportunities 
or through a social safety net.  This can come from anywhere, for example, 
employment or social welfare,176 which goes to say that when these sources are 
limited or absent then there is economic insecurity.  Coca cultivation provides 
necessary livelihoods to impoverished peasants in Bolivia177  and therefore, the 
consideration of economic security is important to the success of the War on 
Drugs, as explained below. 
 
In the early 1980s, Bolivia suffered a major blow to the economy when the price 
of tin (which the Bolivian economy had depended on for decades) fell 
dramatically.  This has been described by Elena Alvarez as “a decline in per capita 
GDP, an increase in absolute poverty, sluggish growth in private investment, 
and…a high external debt burden.”178  Alvarez continues to state that “official 
statistics show that unemployment rose progressively, up to 15% of the labor 
force in 1984, as economic activity declined in the early 1980s” and then after the 
stabilisation programme came into effect in 1985, “unemployment rose even 
more, up to 20% in 1986.”179  This blow to the economy, which led to the closure 
of many of the government’s mines, was mitigated by the coca and cocaine 
industry.180 
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It is difficult to obtain accurate or reliable data on the significance of coca/cocaine 
in the Bolivian economy and society, as most of Bolivia’s domestic coca/cocaine 
industry is underground.181  Nonetheless, estimates indicate that the coca/cocaine 
industry carries huge weight in the Bolivian economy.182  For example, in 
February 1990 at the Cartagena drug summit, Bolivia’s President Jaime Paz 
Zamora told President Bush “that more than half of his country’s imports were 
financed by the coca-cocaine traffic and that 70 percent of real gross national 
product (GNP) was cocaine related.”183 
 
Coca creates economic security for Bolivians in two ways.  Firstly, it creates 
employment/livelihood opportunities where they are otherwise limited.  Secondly, 
coca is a reliable crop that grows well in Bolivia’s harsh conditions where other 
crops struggle to survive.  Furthermore, coca farmers can make premium profits 
because they are part of a monopoly whereas with other crops, they would 
struggle to compete with the rest of the global market.  Therefore, the War on 
Drugs leads to economic insecurity simply by virtue of its strategy to eradicate 
coca in producer-countries, but what is more, the sanctions and coercion adopted 
to implement cooperation with producer-countries also adds to the threats to 
economic security.  These points are discussed in more detail below. 
 
First of all, as mentioned above, for the Bolivian peasant, coca means 
employment opportunities, income, and survival.  In Bolivia, the coca/cocaine 
industry has been integral in creating employment184 and coca cultivation is seen 
as an alternative to urban unemployment.185  As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to 
get exact statistics, but information on Bolivia’s coca/cocaine economy indicate 
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that a significant portion of Bolivians depend on this economy for all, or at least 
part, of their income.  For example, in the 1990s, the drug trade was estimated to 
form up to 20 percent of Bolivia’s gross domestic product (GDP) and about 20 
percent of employment.186 Moreover, a 1992 study by the German Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation found that the eradication of 52,000 hectares of coca 
leaves would reduce Bolivia's GDP by USD400 million, thereby leaving 170,000 
peasant families without an income.187  In 1988 in the Chapare region alone, an 
estimated 42,000 families depended on coca cultivation for their livelihood.188 
Any coca eradication programmes would drive these families toward “economic 
ruin, hunger and, inevitably, back to coca cultivation.”189 
 
The coca/cocaine economy also plays a big part in Bolivia’s economic survival.  
In the 1980s, the coca/cocaine industry helped to ease Bolivia’s economic decline 
after the global price of tin fell in 1985.190  The fall in price inevitably led to the 
closure of the government’s tin mines and hence resulting in the unemployment of 
many.  By the 1990s, the coca/cocaine industry was bringing about USD1 billion 
to the Bolivian economy, which equates to more than all of Bolivia’s legal exports 
combined.191  Even today, the employment and income created by the 
coca/cocaine industry helps to maintain the Bolivian economy.  As estimated by 
Bertam et al., the industry employs roughly 500,000 people, constituting about 20 
percent of the Bolivian workforce.192 
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From this it is evident that the coca/cocaine industry provides economic security 
(which is a key component of freedom from want) to both the Bolivian population 
and Bolivia itself.193  Firstly, coca crops provide work and secondly because 
employment and revenue from the industry (that is injected back into the 
economy) allows the government to run the state.  Therefore any coca eradication 
programme threatens to bring about economic insecurity and hence challenges 
freedom from want. 
 
Another example of a threat to the economic security of Bolivians is the War on 
Drugs’ aim to eradicate coca because coca is in many cases the only reliable crop 
for Bolivians in terms of cultivation success, reasonable profit margins, and sale 
ability.  Coca suits the tough ecological setting that Bolivia presents.  The land in 
many parts of Bolivia is eroded and lacks in nutrients.  Where little thrives in 
many parts of the country, coca is a reliable crop.  Not only can it withstand such 
harsh conditions, it requires little maintenance, can be harvested one year after 
planting, and has a high yield of two to three crops a year for up to 30 years.194  In 
contrast, alternative crops that have been promoted in Bolivia (for example, citrus 
fruits, pineapples, avocados and bananas) can only be harvested once a year.  
Moreover, these crops are vulnerable to pests and disease as well as pigs, birds 
and other livestock. 
 
Coca can also fetch higher revenues for peasant farmers than alternative crops.  
Unlike coca, which is light in weight and can be dried for longer-term storage, 
fresh produce is heavy and rots easily in the heat.  By the time Bolivian farmers 
have paid to transport these goods to market, there is little left for their pockets.  
For example, Bertram et al. assert that “a coca farmer in the Bolivian Chapare 
region could net up to [USD]2,600 per hectare (roughly 2.5 acres) annually from 
coca production in the late 1980s, more than four times what he could from 
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cultivating oranges or avocados, the two most profitable legal crops traditionally 
grown in the region.”195 
 
Furthermore, coca is guaranteed to sell. As mentioned by James Patton, “the only 
economic certainty that the growers have been offered has come from those who 
would purchase the coca leaf, for licit or illicit purposes.”196  Zenon Cruz is a coca 
farmer who was forced to grow beans and oranges in the Chapare region (instead 
of coca).  His quote in the Guardian highlights that not only would peasant 
farmers make more profit from selling coca, but also that coca is more likely to 
sell more easily than any alternative crop: 
 You can fill a lorry with oranges and not sell any of them at market.  But coca 
always sells like hot bread.  I was making 150 bolivianos [about £20/USD29] 
a week before they cut down the coca.  Now we sometimes struggle to make 
20 [£3/USD4.50].  How can you feed a family on that?197 
 
Bolivia is actually one of the best places in the world to grow coca as the high 
altitude means that the coca plant has a higher alkaloid content.  This is one of the 
reasons why peasants often find it easier to market coca than any other crop – the 
Bolivian coca farmers have a global niche in that they are growing a high-demand 
export crop with which they have a competitive advantage.198  As a land-locked 
country, it is very hard for Bolivia to compete with the rest of the global market 
when it comes to any of the alternative crops mentioned earlier.  Sancho Tree is 
quoted in Nick Constable’s This is Cocaine as follows: 
 The United States asks peasant coca farmers to switch to fruit, which they 
must transport in vehicles they don’t have, down roads that don’t exist to sell 
in markets with no buyers.  Even if there were customers the idea that the 
campesinos could compete in an international global market is truly 
farcical.199 
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In summary, coca provides economic security for the coca-growing peasants of 
Bolivia because it provides them with an income.  What is more is that this 
income is more reliable and higher than they would seek through alternative 
crops.  This economic security provides them with livelihoods and opportunities 
to create their own futures, giving them a degree of freedom from want.  Celestino 
Quispe is a coca farmer who was interviewed by the BBC news in La Paz, June 
2000: 
I have five children.  Coca leaves allow me to pay for their education.  My 
children are able to study, which I was not.  I have little choice in what I can 
do for a living now but I am trying to make sure that they get qualifications.  I 
would like them to be able to choose what they want to do in the future.  An 
education is very important because it will give them choice: they will be able 
to decide whether they want to grow coca like me or something different, 
something better.200 
 
Finally, another threat to economic security in Bolivia relates to the annual 
certification process201 provided under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (outlined in 
Chapter 3).  In September 2008, President Evo Morales declared the 
US Ambassador to La Paz, Philip S. Goldberg, persona non grata based on 
allegations that he was interfering with domestic politics.202  Furthermore, later 
that same year, in November, Morales suspended DEA activities in Bolivia on the 
grounds of national security.203  In response to this, the US President George W. 
Bush, decertified Bolivia under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, based on the rationale 
that Bolivia was no longer effective in the drug war.204  Because eligibility to 
privileges under the Andean Trade Preference Act is linked to certification under 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Bush’s decision meant that Bolivia was no longer 
considered fit to receive trade preference to the US.  Further, Bolivia’s 
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‘decertified’ status was maintained by President Barack Obama in July 1 2009 
who stated that Bolivia “[remained] in breach of its obligation to cooperate in the 
War on Drugs.”205  Morales has stated that this act of coercion could cost Bolivia 
around 20,000 jobs206 and it has been reported that Bolivian exports to the U.S. 
have fallen approximately 14 percent since Bolivia was decertified.207 
 
The loss of jobs, as a result of the decertification and consequential loss of US 
trade preferences, highlights an additional threat to Bolivia’s economic security.  
In this example, we see freedom from fear in contention with freedom from want 
because the War on Drugs’ attempt at coercion through sanctions (a freedom from 
fear approach) creates a threat to the livelihoods of Bolivians (which is economic 
security - an essential component of freedom from want).  
 
Any successful coca eradication policy would be followed by economic insecurity 
in Bolivia because the economic reliance on coca by Bolivians is so great.  In 
typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs illustrates how freedom from fear 
threatens freedom from want through its neglect of economic security and 
henceforth creates economic insecurity in two ways.  First, the War on Drugs’ 
coca eradication policy threatens to eradicate the one reliable and viable source of 
livelihoods (economic security) available to many Bolivian peasants – coca.  
Second, the use of decertification (as a sanction), or the removal of the right to 
previously established trade preferences to the US, has potentially led to the 
economic insecurity of a number of Bolivians through the loss of employment. 
 
                                                          
205 Latin American Herald Tribune, “Bolivian Blasts U.S. Over Denial of Trade Preferences,” 
Latin American Herald Tribune, July 2, 2009, 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=338380. 
206 Bajak, “US cuts Bolivian tariff exemptions on drug efforts.” 
207 Latin American Herald Tribune, “Bolivian Blasts U.S. Over Denial of Trade Preferences.” 
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(b) Community Security 
Community security is about cultural dignity and inter-community peace by 
recognising that security can be derived from membership of a group.208  
According to Bajpai, threats to community security are “breakdown of the family, 
collapse of traditional languages and cultures, ethnic discrimination and strife, 
genocide and ethnic cleansing”.209 
 
Like economic security, community security is not a justification of the War on 
Drugs in Bolivia.  In spite of this, the War on Drugs has had a significant impact 
on the community security of Bolivians, particularly with regard to cultural 
dignity, but to a certain extent it has also affected inter-community peace.  
Similarly to economic security, the absence of community security demonstrates 
the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want.   
 
The Bolivian population is composed of the following ethnic groups: 15 percent 
European, 30 percent mestizo and 55 percent indigenous.210  Indigenous Bolivians 
(in other words, a majority of Bolivians) have been using coca for a thousand 
years in religious and social ceremonies211 and for a variety of other purposes 
ranging from the medicinal to appetite and thirst suppressants to shampoos and 
soaps.212  According to Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabria, the 
traditional role of coca in Bolivian culture is not to be taken for granted because it 
still plays an integral part in the lives of the Aymara and Quechua-speaking 
peasants who make up the majority of the rural population living in Bolivia.213  In  
                                                          
208 UNDP, “New Dimensions of Human Security”, Human Development Report 1994, p31. 
209 Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 16. 
210 “U.S. Department of State website,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm. 
211 Elliot, The Bolivian Times, 19. 
212 Friesendorf, US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin 
industry, 18. 
213 Leons and Sanabria, “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion,” 3-4. 
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a letter to the UN Secretary General, President Evo Morales stated: 
The custom of chewing coca leaves in the Andean region of South America 
dates back to 3,000 B.C.  Historical evidence demonstrates that the coca leaf 
has been used for thousands of years in Andean culture, both pre-Incan and 
Incan, and for centuries by the Amazonian and Guaraní peoples. 
 
The chewing or “acullico” of the coca leaf is part of the socio-cultural 
practices and rituals for the Indigenous Andean peoples.  It is intimately 
linked to our history and cultural identity. 
 
It is currently practised by millions of people in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, 
Colombia, and northern Argentina and Chile.  Its use and symbolism has 
ritualistic, religious, and socio-cultural meaning that extends past the sphere 
of Indigenous culture to include mestizo sectors. 
 
The chewing of the coca leaf helps mitigate the sensation of hunger, gives 
energy during long days of labor, and improves metabolism at high 
altitudes.214 
 
The role that acullico plays in terms of cultural identity is also acknowledged at a 
regional level in a joint declaration signed by the Heads of State and Government 
of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America – Peoples Trade Treaty 
(the ALBA-TCP).215  Article 26 of this declaration states:  “The defense of 
cultural identity and diversity is essential in the fight against neocolonialism.  In 
this sense, it is important to progress in the revalorization and decriminalization of 
coca leaf chewing, as well as removing the coca leaf from Schedule 1 of the 
Convention on Narcotics Drugs of 1961.”216 
 
The elimination of coca leaf chewing is an objective of the War on Drugs, 
alongside coca eradication.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, the UN Single 
Convention of Narcotic Drugs states that coca chewing must be abolished within 
25 years of the treaty coming into place.  As such, this quest is directly at odds 
with the community security of Bolivians and hence is another illustration of how 
                                                          
214 Evo Morales Ayma, “Letter from President Evo Morales to U.N. Secretary General,” March 
12, 2009. 
215 Member countries of the ALBA-TCP are Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba and Honduras. 
216 Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the ALBA-TCP member countries and 
Translated by the Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the U.N., “Official Declaration: VII Summit of 
Heads of State and Government of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-
Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP),” October 19, 2009. 
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the War on Drugs, typified as freedom from fear, is at tension with freedom from 
want.   
 
Further, it is not just coca leaf chewing that is characteristic of what it means to be 
Bolivian because the cultivation of coca is too.  Evo Morales and cocaleros (most 
of whom are Aymara Indians)217 believe that the right to grow coca comes as part 
of being Aymara.218  The coca leaf (whether it be chewing or cultivating) is 
argued to be inherently part of what it means to be Bolivian and this is recognised 
in Bolivia’s Constitution.  Article 384 of the Constitution of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia states:  “The State protects the originary and ancestral coca as 
cultural patrimony, as a renewable natural resource of the biodiversity of Bolivia, 
and as a factor of social unity.”219  Even so, the War on Drugs, through Law 1008, 
fails to recognise the right to grow coca regardless of where in Bolivia a peasant 
farmer may live.   
                                                          
 
In more detail, Title I of Law 1008 commits Bolivia to eradicating coca across the 
country.  Title I categorises Bolivia’s coca cultivation areas into three types of 
zones: 
(1) Zone One, known as the legal cultivation zone, allowed for 12,000 
hectares of coca to be grown legally.  Areas that fall into this zone 
are acknowledged as areas in which “historical, social and 
agroecologically coca has been grown” and therefore, the coca 
from this zone meets the demand of traditional consumption (for 
example, the North and South Yungas, Murillo, Dolls, Franz 
Tamayo and Inquisivi provinces of the Department of La Paz);220 
 
217 The Aymara nation is an ethnic group of about 2.5 million people who live in Bolivia and 
some southern parts of Peru. 
218 Tosti, “Can IR Address the International Drug Trade.” 
219 Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2009, Article 384. 
220 Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas / System Law of Coca and Controlled 
Substances, 1988, Article 9. (translated by google) 
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(2) Zone Two was known as the transitional zone, and this zone 
represents those parts of Bolivia where coca cultivation had 
expanded to under the demand of illicit use.  Therefore, the coca 
from this area is mainly used for illicit consumption and includes 
the Saavedra, Larecaja and Loayza provinces in the La Paz 
Department as well as the Chapare, Carrasco, Tiraque and Arani in 
the Cochabamba Department.  As coca in these areas is considered 
as ‘excess’, Law 1008 subjects the areas to annual eradication 
plans that started with a yearly eradication target of 5,000 hectares, 
which was to be built up to 8,000 hectares per year.  The statute 
also notes that alternative development plays an important role in 
achieving this goal;221 and finally, 
(3) Zone Three was known as the illicit or illegal zone.  This zone 
refers to areas where land is used for illegal production and 
actually refers to anywhere in Bolivia that does not fall into the 
other two zones.  For example, the new colonisation area of 
Yapacaní in Santa Cruz.  Here, Law 1008 states that any coca 
growing in this zone is to be destroyed without compensation.222 
Law 1008 designates only coca cultivation areas classified as Zone One may 
legally cultivate coca.  Consequently, this piece of legislation denies those 
cocaleros who live outside of the designated legal cultivation zone of a 
fundamental cultural right and threatens their and other indigenous Bolivians’ 
community security. 
 
Another aspect of community security is the idea of inter-community peace.  The 
War on Drugs in Bolivia also threatens this aspect of community security, as 
noted by James Patton, “the most significant impact of widespread arrests and 
human rights abuses has been the production of a deep insecurity in the 
                                                          
221 Ibid., Article 10. 
222 Ibid., Article 11. 
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community and disruption of the family.”223  Rural life cannot survive without 
community and family, as it depends on these structures for economic survival.  
When the man of the house is arrested, the woman and children follow him to 
prison, and this then places a greater burden on the under-resourced prisons; a 
burden that is even further increased due to the high levels of prisoners 
imprisoned without trial.  
 
To summarise, by considering the War on Drugs in Bolivia from the perspective 
of community security, the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from 
want can be seen in two ways.  First of all, because the War on Drugs only takes 
into account a limited number of human security concerns (mainly personal and 
political security), it has a certain preoccupation with the violent, criminal and 
corrupt side of the coca industry.  In doing so, it fails to consider the significant 
role that coca plays in Bolivian culture and therefore shows that the freedom from 
fear framework, which the War on Drugs in Bolivia typifies, conflicts with 
freedom from want as it undermines the cultural dignity of Bolivians and has 
significant deleterious effects on incomes.  Secondly, by considering cultural 
security, it becomes clear that the use of force and sanctions, adopted by the War 
on Drugs, impacts not just the political security of individuals, but also their 
cultural security as their sense of inter-community peace is disrupted. 
 
An economic and community security perspective of the War on Drugs in Bolivia 
has revealed that freedom from fear and freedom from want are not 
complementary to each other, and that the pursuit of freedom from fear can lead to 
the detriment of freedom from want.  By focusing on providing personal, political, 
environmental, food and health security, the War on Drugs in Bolivia through its 
fight to eradicate coca and coca chewing, marginalises and neglects coca’s role in 
providing opportunities for livelihoods and cultural dignity to Bolivians.  This in 
turn leads to economic and community insecurity.   
 
                                                          
223 Patton, “Counterdevelopmnent and the Bolivian Coca War,” 5. 
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4.3 How the War on Drugs in Bolivia Impacts Upon Food and Health 
Security 
Food security means physical and economic access to food at all times.224  
Accordingly, a lack of food entitlements threatens food security.  Health security 
is freedom from disease or debilitating illness and access to health care.  It is 
linked with poor nutrition and unsafe environments, thereby recognising that 
threats to health security are primarily greater for the poor, those in rural areas, 
and women and children.225 
 
The War on Drugs in Bolivia can be seen as justifying itself on the grounds of 
food and health security in the sense that food crops are being cleared to make 
way for coca crops (due to the temptation of money associated with coca) and as a 
result, malnutrition is on the rise.  However, in this instance both food and health 
security are closely linked to environmental security, which means that any 
impact on the environment also impacts upon the food and health dimensions.  
For example, aerobiology (the spraying of pesticides/herbicides from low-flying 
aircrafts) is one of the forms of eradication adopted in the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia and was discussed in the environmental security section of this chapter.  
Not only does aerobiology upset ecosystems, but it also destroys legal crops 
(including sustainable food crops) and can cause birth defects and other health 
problems.226  As stated by Christina Jacqueline Johns in Power, Ideology, and the 
War on Drugs: nothing succeeds like failure: “eradication programs have created 
health problems by destroying not only coca crops, and by their use of toxic 
chemicals.”227  Additionally, this method for fighting the War on Drugs leads to 
food contamination and poisoning, which in developing country like Bolivia, is 
exacerbated by a “lack of adequate medical care, chronic malnutrition, and other 
health problems.”228 
                                                          
224 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report, 27. 
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 Again, the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want is apparent.  
By typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs in Bolivia misses the holistic 
approach offered by freedom from want.  Despite considering environmental 
security (as well as personal and political security), the War on Drugs in Bolivia, 
fails to recognise the interdependent nature of the dimensions and that the pursuit 
of security in one dimension without taking others into account can threaten 
human security overall.   
 
In this chapter it has been demonstrated that the War on Drugs in Bolivia has 
compromised the human security of Bolivians.  The War on Drugs in Bolivia has 
failed to protect individuals from physical violence, human rights abuses, 
environmental degradation and threats to food and health security.  Further and 
most central to this thesis, the War on Drugs in Bolivia has shown the tension that 
exists between freedom from fear and freedom from want because as a typical 
freedom from fear approach, the War on Drugs in Bolivia marginalises and 
threatens economic and community security, which are key concepts to freedom 
from want.   
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
A human security analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia, illustrates that it can be 
typified as a freedom from fear approach.  By accepting the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia as characteristic of a freedom from fear approach it can be seen that it 
marginalises freedom from want, but in particular the dimensions of economic 
and community security.  By marginalising aspects of freedom from want, the 
War on Drugs in Bolivia is to the detriment of freedom from want, and 
simultaneously threatens the goal of human security itself.  This analysis of the 
War on Drugs therefore leaves hollow the suggestion that the War on Drugs is 
conducted for the security of the Bolivian people.  This conclusion suggests an 
alternative motivation for the War on Drugs as a possible means to extend the US’ 
influence in South America.   
 
Additionally, this thesis has demonstrated that in order for an anti-drug strategy to 
be successful in Bolivia, it is necessary to move beyond the classical security and 
freedom from fear paradigm.  By typifying the War on Drugs in Bolivia as 
freedom from fear, it can be seen that it misses out on the holistic approach 
offered by freedom from want.  The resulting effect is that actions made in the 
pursuit of one dimension (or several specific dimensions) can have negative 
impacts on others.  For example, even though personal, political, environmental, 
food and health security are justifications for the War on Drugs in Bolivia, the 
goal and means adopted to fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia have had a negative 
impact on economic, community, as well as personal, political, environmental, 
food and health security.  Therefore, this case study suggests that the assumption 
that freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary in the human 
security approach must be seriously questioned. 
 
Furthermore, a human security analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia has 
inferred that whether freedom from fear or freedom from want is adopted can 
have an impact on how the problem itself is framed.  For the War on Drugs in 
Bolivia, the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want 
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highlighted the distinction between coca and cocaine - where one is a threat to 
human security while the other is not.  In fact, framing coca as a threat to human 
security, which a freedom from fear approach inevitably does, has actually led to 
human insecurity for Bolivians. 
 
This thesis has revealed the need for any strategy seeking to address human 
security threats, which result from the illicit drug trade in Bolivia, to be based 
around the holistic approach of freedom from want.  The need for a freedom from 
want approach, over a freedom from fear approach, is clearly applicable and 
necessary within the developing country context of Bolivia, but the extent to 
which a freedom from want approach would be necessary in dealing with threats 
within developed countries merits further research.  Additional research into how 
differing socio-economic situations demand greater or lesser emphasis on a 
freedom from want approach alongside freedom from fear approaches, would 
assist in the understanding of transnational threats to human security, and in the 
formulating of strategies and approaches to counter them.  
 
By showing that, in Bolivia, the pursuit of freedom from fear has come to the 
detriment of freedom from want, we can see that our understanding of human 
security falls short with regard to how human security should be approached in 
developing countries.  As suggested in the case study of this thesis, the pursuit of 
freedom from fear comes at a loss of the freedom from want of people in 
developing countries.  Security policies adopted to address transnational threats in 
such contexts must not only ensure that they account for the freedom from fear 
and freedom from want components of human security, but they must also 
account for, and manage, the potential for freedom from fear to undermine the 
wider goals of freedom from want. 
73 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Acharya, Amitav. “Human Security: East versus West.” International Journal 56, no. 3 
(Summer 2001): 442-460.   
Aljazeera. “Summit criticises US-Colombia deal.” Aljazeera, August 29, 2009. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/08/200982904428579318.html. 
Alkire, Sabina. “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2).” 
Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, 2003. 
Alvarez, Elena H. “Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in 
Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs 37, no. 3 (1995): 125-149.   
Ambos, Kai. “Attempts at Drug Control in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.” Crime, Law and 
Social Change 26, no. 2 (June 1996): 125-160.   
Amouyel, Alexandra. “What is Human Security?” Revue de Sécurité Humaine / Human 
Security Journal, no. 1 (April 2006): 10-23.   
Argañaras, Fernando Garcia. “The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia.” 
Latin American Perspectives 24, no. 5 (September 1997): 59-80.   
Axworthy, Lloyd. “Canada and Human Security: the need for leadership.” International 
Journal LII (1997): 183-196.   
Bajak, Frank. “UN: Colombia Coca Crop Down; Peru and Bolivia Up.” ABC News, June 
19, 2009. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7880731. 
———“US cuts Bolivian tariff exemptions on drug efforts.” guardian.co.uk, June 30, 
2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8586845. 
Bajpai, Kanti. “Human Security: Concept and Measurement.” Kroc Institute, August 
2000. 
Baldwin, David A. “The Concept of Security.” Review of International Studies 23, no. 1 
(January 1997): 5-26.   
BBC Mundo. “My story: The coca grower.” BBC News, June 6, 2000. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/779662.stm. 
BBC news. “US poised to join Mexico drug war.” BBC News, March 18, 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7949665.stm. 
Berestein, Leslie. “Can Mexico learn from Colombia's drug war?.” Sign on San Diego, 
February 16, 2009. 
http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2009/feb/16/1n16colombia00218-
colombia-drug-war-continues-desp/. 
Bertram, Eva, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas. Drug War Politics: 
The Price of Denial. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.   
Blair, Jon. “Inside the terror of Rio's drugs war.” The Independent, October 21, 2009. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-terror-of-rios-
drugs-war-1806292.html. 
74 
Bodenheimer, Thomas, and Robert Gould. Rollback! Right-Wing Power in US Foreign 
Policy. Boston: South End Press.   
Boyle, Kevin, and Sigmund Simonsen. “Human Security, Human Rights and 
Disarmament.” Disarmament Forum 3 (2004): 5-14.   
Buenos Aires Herald. “Urbe backs Washington military agreement, Chavez says US 
preparing for war.” Buenos Aires Herald, August 31, 2009. 
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/BreakingNews/View/10357. 
Calvani, Sandro. “Global Trends and Key Issues on Illicit Drugs: Drug Reduction 
Policies and Alternative Development.” Development Bulletin, no. 69. Illicit 
Drugs and Development (February 2009): 10-13.   
———“Perspectives of Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear in the African 
Union” presented at the international round table “L’Africa in Corsa?” in occasion 
of the new publication of the Finisterrae magazine, Turin, Italy, February 24, 
2009. 
Carpenter, T.G. Bad Neighbour Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin 
America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.   
Carroll, Rory. “Cocaine production surge unleashes wave of violence in Latin America.” 
Guardian.co.uk, March 9, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/09/cocaine-production-united-
nations-summit. 
———“The fine line between coca and cocaine - Guardian Weekly.” The Guardian 
Weekly, November 25, 2009. 
http://www.guardianweekly.co.uk/?page=editorial&id=1358&catID=17. 
Carroll, Rory, and Andres Schipani. “Bolivia calls time on bizarre world of prison 
frequented by tourists.” Guardian.co.uk, July 8, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/08/bolivia-bans-tourists-entering-jail. 
Chavez, Franz, and Diana Cariboni. “Drugs-Bolivia: The Friendly Fight.” Inter Press 
Service, January 5, 2007. http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36076. 
Chomsky, Noam. “Militarizing Latin America.” In These Times, September 8, 2009. 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/4864/militarizing_latin_america/. 
Cohen, Paul T. “Help as a Threat: alternative development and the 'War on Drugs' in 
Bolivia and Laos.” Development Bulletin, no. 69. Illicit Drugs and Development 
(February 2009): 31-35.   
Colitt, Raymond. “Lula to push Obama on Latin America policy.” Reuters, December 3, 
2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52B5WD20090312. 
Collyns, Dan. “Peru coca farmers warn government.” BBC News, April 19, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6570513.stm. 
Constable, Nick. This is Cocaine. London: Sanctuary Publishing Ltd, 2002.   
Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2009. 
75 
Daily Maverick. “Bolivian indigenes' movement continues its rise as Evo Morales claims 
re-election as president.” News. The Daily Maverick, December 14, 2009. 
http://www.thedailymaverick.co.za/article/2009-12-07-Bolivian-indigenes-
movement-continues-its-rise-as-Evo-Morales-claims-re-election-as-president-. 
Del Olmo, Rosa. “Aerobiology and the War on Drugs: A Transnational Crime.” Crime 
and Social Justice, no. 30: 28-44.   
“Diplomatic Blue Book 1999, Chapter II, Section 3.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. 
www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/other/bluebook/1999/II-3-a.html. 
Elliot, Tim. The Bolivian Times. Sydney: Random House Australia, 2001.   
European NGO Council on Drugs and Development. Drugs and Development Newsletter, 
No. 27. Antwerp, 2001.   
Farthing, Linda. “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008.” In Coca, Cocaine 
and the Bolivian Reality, edited by Madeline Barbara Leons and Harry Sanabria, 
253-269. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.   
Farthing, Linda, and Kathryn Ledebur. “The Beat Goes On: the U.S. War on Coca.” 
NACLA Report on the Americas, December 2004. 
Ferenczi, Imre. “Freedom from Want and International Relations Policy.” American 
Sociological Review 8, no. 5 (October 1943): 537-542.   
Friedman-Rudovsky, Jean. “Bolivia to Expel US Ambassador.” Time Online, September 
11, 2008. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1840469,00.html. 
———“Bolivia's Revolutionary New Charter.” Time Online, January 27, 2009. 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874157,00.html. 
———“Why Bolivia Quit the U.S. War on Drugs.” Time Online, November 4, 2008. 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1856153,00.html. 
Friesendorf, Cornelius. US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine 
and heroin industry. CSS Studies in Security and International Relations. New 
York: Routledge, 2007.   
Friman, Richard, and Peter Andreas, eds. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. 
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999.   
Gamarra, Eduardo A. “Fighting Drugs in Bolivia: United States and Bolivian Perceptions 
at Odds.” In Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality, edited by Madeline Barbara 
Leons and Harry Sanabria, 243-252. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1997.   
Gluesing, Jens. “A Political Drug War in Bolivia: Is Coca the New Hemp?” Spiegel 
Online, March 28, 2006. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,408364,00.html. 
Goldacre, Ben. “Bad science: cocaine study that got up the nose of the US.” 
guardian.co.uk, June 13, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/13/bad-science-cocaine-
study. 
76 
Goodenough, Patrick. “Latin American Leaders Prepare to Squeeze Colombia Over 
Military Base Deal With U.S..” CNS News, August 25, 2009. 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/52998. 
Goranov, Alexi. “Capitalism and Functioning Democracy Are at Odds.” The Tech, 
November 20, 2009. http://tech.mit.edu/V129/N55/goranov.html. 
Heinbecker, Paul. “Human Security.” Behind the Headlines 56, no. 2 (1999): 4-9.   
Holden, Robert H., and Eric Zolov, eds. Latin America and the United States: A 
Documentary History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.   
Human Security Centre. Human Security Brief 2005. Liu Insitute for Global Issues, 
University of British Columbia, 2005. http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/main.jsp?page=165. 
“Human Security Report Project.” Human Security Report Project. 
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=
1. 
Hylton, Forrest, and Thomas Sinclair. Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in 
Bolivian Politics. London and New York: Verso.   
International Crisis Group. “ICG Report: Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian 
Revolution.” International Crisis Group, November 5, 2009. 
http://www.newssafety.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16
362:icg-report-venezuela-accelerating-the-bolivarian-
revolution&catid=66:venezuela-security&Itemid=100310. 
Irish Times. “Drug use of innocent coca leaf creates rift with US.” Irish Times, March 16, 
2009. 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2009/0316/1224242906528.html. 
Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the ALBA-TCP member countries, and 
Translated by the Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the U.N. “Official Declaration: 
VII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America-Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP),” October 19, 2009. 
Jelsma, M. Vicious Circle: The Chemical and Biological 'War on Drugs'. Amsterdam: 
Transnational Institute.   
Johns, Christina Jacqueline. Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs. Praeger Series in 
Criminology and Crime Control Policy. New York: Praeger, 1992.   
Kerr, Peter. “Bolivia, With U.S. Aid, Battles Cocaine at the Root.” The New York Times, 
April 17, 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/17/world/bolivia-with-us-aid-
battles-cocaine-at-the-root.html?pagewanted=1. 
King, Gary, and Christopher J. L. Murray. “Rethinking Human Security.” Political 
Science Quarterly 116, no. 4 (2002 Winter 2001): 585-610.   
Kobo, Kinsley. “Obama hails Nigeria's anti-drug war.” Africa News, October 12, 2009. 
http://www.africanews.com/site/Obama_hails_Nigerias_antidrug_war/list_messag
es/27384. 
77 
Kraul, Chris, and Paul Richter. “U.S., Venezuela to restore full diplomatic ties.” Los 
Angeles times, June 26, 2009. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/26/world/fg-us-
venezuela26. 
Laflash, Karen A. “Plan Colombia: Is US Foreign Policy Increasing Human Rights 
Violations in Colombia?.” Chicago: University of Denver, 2004. 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/1/1/7/p61172
_index.html. 
Latin American Herald Tribune. “Bolivia, U.S. Look to Mend Frayed Ties.” Latin 
American Herald Tribune, June 24, 2009. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=335489. 
———“Bolivian Blasts U.S. Over Denial of Trade Preferences.” Latin American Herald 
Tribune, July 2, 2009. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=338380. 
———“Bolivian, Russian Leaders Meet in Moscow.” Latin American Herald Tribune, 
February 17, 2009. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=327772. 
———“Latin America on Its Way to Legalizing Drugs, Experts Say.” Latin Americna 
Herald Tribune, August 9, 2009. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=341018&CategoryId=12394. 
———“Morales: U.S. Has No Right to Judge Bolivia’s Anti-Drug Fight.” Latin 
American Herald Tribune, September 21, 2009. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=343867&CategoryId=14919. 
———“Police Dismantle 2 Coke Labs, Arrest 8 in Bolivia.” Latin American Herald 
Tribune, June 9, 2009. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=336783&CategoryId=14919. 
———“Police Dismantle Huge Cocaine Lab in Eastern Bolivia.” Latin American Herald 
Tribune, May 9, 2009. 
http://laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=334132. 
Leichtman, Ellen C. “Bolivia, Coca, and US Foreign Policy.” Critical Criminology 9, no. 
1-2 (September 2000): 63-84.   
Leons, Madeline Barbara, and Harry Sanabria. “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality 
and Policy Illusion.” In Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997.   
Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas / System Law of Coca and 
Controlled Substances, 1988 (translated by google). 
Livingstone, Grace. “Colombia's desert war.” guardian.co.uk, March 12, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/12/colombia-drug-war. 
Marshall, Jonathan. Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations 
in the Third World. Forestville: Cohan and Cohen Publishers, 1991.   
78 
Morales Ayma, Evo. “If We Don't Defend Mother Earth's Rights, There's No Use in 
Defending Human Rights,” 64th Session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, September 23, 2009. 
———“Let Me Chew My Coca Leaves.” New York Times, March 14, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/opinion/14morales.html. 
———Letter. “Letter from President Evo Morales to U.N. Secretary General,” March 12, 
2009. 
Newman, Edward. “Human Security and Constructivism.” International Studies 
Perspectives 2 (2001): 239-251.   
“Norway's Official Site in Canada.” http://norwayportal.mfa.no/en/Norway---the-official-
site-in-Canada/News_and_events/norwaycanada/history/history/. 
Obama, Barack. Letter. “Determinations and Report of the President Concerning the 
Review of Ecuador and Bolivia Under the Andean Trade Preference Act, As 
Amended,” June 30, 2009. 
Omoniyi, Tosin. “Obama Impressed with Nigeria’s Anti-Drug War,” November 4, 2009. 
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1
474&Itemid=1. 
Palmer, Doug. “Lawmakers mull short-term trade benefit renewal | Reuters.” Reuters, 
December 8, 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B74P520091208. 
Paris, Roland. “Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?.” International Security 26, 
no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 87-102.   
Patton, James. “Counterdevelopmnent and the Bolivian Coca War.” Praxis: The Fletcher 
Journal of Development Studies 17 (2002).   
Pilger, John. “War is peace, ignorance is strength.” The New Statesman, October 15, 
2009. http://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2009/10/obama-pilger-
war-peace. 
Posso, Gonzalez D. “Coca, Deforestation and Food Security in the Colombian Amazon 
Region.” UN FAO, 2000. 
Proceedings of the ASEAN-UNESCO Concept Workshop on Human Security in South-
East Asia. Jakarta, Indonesia: UNESCO, October 25, 2006. 
Rocha, Raul. “The Political Economy of Counterdrug Policy: the case of Bolivia, 1997-
2006.” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2007.   
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. “The Four Freedoms Speech” presented at the State of the 
Union, January 6, 1941. 
Salm, Hans, and Maximo Liberman. “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation.” In 
Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality, edited by Madeline Barbara Leons and 
Harry Sanabria, 211-227. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.   
Santos, Solimar. “Unintended Consequences of United States' Foreign Drug Policy in 
Bolivia.” Inter-American Law Review 33, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 127-151.   
79 
Schipani, Andres. “Coca casts shadow on Bolivian election.” BBC News, November 12, 
2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/8364909.stm. 
Sciolino, Elaine. “Drug Production Rising Worldwide, State Dept. Says.” New York 
Times, March 2, 1989, sec. A. 
Seattle Times. “DEA leaves Bolivia.” Seattle Times, January 30, 2009. 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008687815_newsline30.html. 
Solon (Bolivia UN Representative), Pablo. Radio, March 1, 2009. 
Sullum, Jacob. “The war on poppies flops.” Washington Times, July 11, 2009. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/11/the-war-on-poppies-flops/. 
The Democracy Center. “Cocalero Expansions Draw Conflict.” Blog from Bolivia, 
September 28, 2009. http://www.democracyctr.org/blog/2009/09/cocalero-
expansions-draw-conflict.html. 
The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, December 2001. http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp. 
Thomas, Pamela. “Illicit Drugs and Development Critical Issues for Asia and the 
Pacific.” Development Bulletin, no. 69. Illicit Drugs and Development (February 
2009): 10-13.   
Thorpe, Nick. “Leaves on the line | World news | The Guardian.” guardian.co.uk, August 
25, 2000. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/aug/25/bolivia. 
Thoumi, F.E. El Imperio de la Droga: Narcotrafico, Economia y Sociedad en Los Andes. 
Bogota: Planeta.   
Tokatlian, J.G. Drogas, Dilemmas y Dogmas: Estados Unidos y el Narcocriminalidad 
Organizada En Colombia. Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores.   
Tosti, Padideh. “Can IR Address the International Drug Trade.” San Diego, 2006. 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/7/9/5/p97951
_index.html. 
 “U.S. Department of State website.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm. 
“UN SC presidential statement calls for stronger international cooperation with global, 
regional bodies against drug trafficking.” Relief Web. 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-7YK3UC?OpenDocument. 
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations 1945. http://www.un.org. 
———Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971. 
———Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 protocol, 1961. 
———United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988. 
———Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
80 
81 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Human Development Report, 1990. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1990_en_chap1.pdf, accessed 13 February 
2010. 
———Human Development Report, 1994. 
———“Redefining Security: The Human Dimension.” Current History 94 (May 1995): 
229-236.   
“United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website.” http://www.unodc.org. 
Wade, Terry, and Marco Aquino. “Peru's Indian groups gain strength, push for change.” 
Reuters, June 19, 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN19447160. 
Wade, Terry, and Claudia Parsons. “Chavez now smells hope at U.N. after Bush 
sulphur.” Reuters, September 24, 2009. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58N69C20090924. 
Wallace-Wells, Ben. “How America Lost the War on Drugs.” Rolling Stone, December 
13, 2007. 
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/17438347/how_america_lost_the_war_o
n_drugs. 
Weisbrot, Mark. “Latin America's economic rebels.” guardian.co.uk, October 28, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/oct/27/bolivia-
ecuador-economy. 
Wells, Simon. “A Human Security Approach to US Illegal Drugs Policy.” Revue de 
Sécurité Humaine / Human Security Journal, no. 1 (April 2006): 51-64.   
“What is Human Security?” 
http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/lie/files/Publications/what_is_HS.pdf. 
Zirnite, P. “The Militarization of the Drug War in Latin America.” Current History 97, 
no. 618: 166-173.   
 
